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INTRODUCTION

Much judicial and scholarly attention has addressed the definition of competency and when it must be ascertained in varying legal
contexts.' However, little attention has been given to the procedures
* Copyright 1993 by Bruce J. Winick. Professor of Law, University of Miami School of
Law. I would like to thank Michael Perlin for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the
manuscript and acknowledge the research assistance of Jennifer Levin, University of Miami
School of Law, Class of 1993.
1. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (competency to consent to voluntary
hospitalization); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (competency to be executed); Drope
v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) (competency to stand trial); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375
(1966) (competency to stand trial); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (competency
to stand trial);
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(1968); PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY
AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987); Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of CriminalDefendants.A Theoretical Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291 (1992); Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of
Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977); Elyn R. Saks,
INCOMPETENCY
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used in determining competency. 2 This Article will examine these
procedural issues by focusing on the burden of proof in determining
competency to stand trial in the criminal process. It will analyze the
United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Medina v. California,3 which upheld the constitutionality of a California statute that

erected a presumption in favor of competency to stand trial and
placed the burden of proof upon the party asserting the defendant's

incompetency.
In upholding the statute, the Court departed from precedent by
rejecting the application of the Mathews v. Eldridge4 balancing test as

the appropriate standard to determine due process in criminal cases.
Instead, the Court adopted an historically based test that limits the
requirements of due process to traditional notions of fairness.Because traditional practices did not reject placement of the burden of
proof upon the defendant when the defense seeks a finding of incompetency, the Court declined to hold that the California statute violated due process.

This Article analyzes the Court's new due process methodology
in criminal cases and the merits of its decision to uphold the California statute's presumption in favor of competency to stand trial and its
placement of the burden of proof on the party asserting incompetency. Part II examines the Court's opinion in Medina and the new
due process approach that it adopts. Part III analyzes the criticisms
of the Court's new approach in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion and in Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion. This Part then criticizes the majority's historical approach as too restrictive and
Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C. L. REV. 945 (1991); Bruce J. Winick, Competency to
Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 HOUSTON L. REV. 15
(1991) [hereinafter Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment]; Bruce J. Winick,
Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A Therapeutic JurisprudenceAnalysis of
Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 169 (1991) [hereinafter Winick, Voluntary
Hospitalization]; Bruce J. Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Developments in the Law, in
MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 3

(John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1983) [hereinafter Winick, Incompetency to Stand
Trial].
2. But see, Ford, 477 U.S. at 412-18 (analyzing the constitutionality of Florida's
procedures for determining competency to be executed); Bruce J. Winick, Competency to be
Executed: A Therapeutic JurisprudencePerspective, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 317, 324-28 (1992)
[hereinafter Winick, Competency to be Executed] (analyzing procedures for determining
competency to be executed); Winick, Voluntary Hospitalization, supra note 1, at 199-212
(analyzing the procedures that should be required for determining competency to consent to
voluntary hospitalization).
3. 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992).
4. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
5. Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2577.
6. Id. at 2578-81.
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inconsistent with much of the Court's existing criminal justice juris-

prudence. Part III also discusses the inconsistency of the Court's new
methodology with the need for judicial flexibility in considering the
fairness of criminal practices historically deemed just or approved in
precedent.
Part IV considers the question of allocating the burden of proof
on the issue of incompetency to stand trial. This Part examines the
majority's application of its new due process standard to the burden
of proof issue as well as the application of the Mathews v. Eldridge
balancing test by the concurring and dissenting opinions. Although
Part III criticizes the majority's new approach, I conclude that placing the burden on the party challenging competency is correct. The
Court's new approach, proper application of the Mathews standard,
and consideration of three factors-fairness, probability, and policyoften invoked in determining the allocation of burdens of proof, all
support this conclusion. The California statute's allocation of the
burden of proof promotes several significant social policies. Its allocation of the burden may reduce a number of inappropriate burdens
imposed by the incompetency-to-stand-trial doctrine. Moreoever, it
should facilitate the speedy disposition of criminal charges; and
enhance therapeutic values, increasing the mental health of affected
defendants.
Part V considers the importance of the presumption in favor of
competency established by the California statute, and the implications
of its endorsement by the Supreme Court. Although a presumption in
favor of the competency of the mentally ill is one of the major reforms
of modern mental health law, broad dicta in Zinermon v. Burch7 calls
into question the continued viability of this presumption. While the
issues presented in Medina are different from those in Zinermon, the
Court's approval of the presumption in favor of competency in
Medina steps away from the implications of the Zinermon dicta. Part
V analyzes the importance of the presumption for mental health law
doctrine, and hails the decision to uphold the presumption in Medina
as an important step toward a general presumption in favor of
competency.
Finally, Part VI argues that the Court could have reached the
same result in Medina by applying the Mathews balancing test.
Accordingly, this Part contends that the Court's new due process
methodology is dicta. Because this dicta is highly questionable, the
Article concludes that the Court should reconsider its approach in
future cases.
7. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
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MEDINA V. CALIFORNIA AND THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW
APPROACH FOR DETERMINING THE REQUIREMENTS OF
DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL CASES

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, along
with the Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities Clauses,
effected a fundamental reordering of the American constitutional system.' These provisions placed significant new limitations on the
states, extending greater protection for individual liberties than the
original Constitution and the Bill of Rights afforded.' In the criminal
area, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposed
procedural requirements that dramatically increased the fairness of
the administration of criminal justice in the states. For the first century of its history, scholarly debate focused on whether the Due Process Clause incorporated the provisions of the Bill of Rights, thereby
making them applicable to the states. Under a selective incorporation
approach, the Supreme Court gradually applied to the states virtually
all of the guarantees in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments.' ° This incorporation produced the criminal law revolution
often associated with the Warren Court.
8. See RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF
RIGHTS 11 (1981); Robert Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship and
Civil Rights After the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 45 (1981). See generally WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:

FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL

DOCTRINE (1988).
9. The original Constitution imposed several relatively minor limitations on state
legislatures. E.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall.., pass any Bill of Attainder,
ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... ); id. art. IV, § 1 ("Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State."); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."). With these
exceptions, the original Constitution did not place direct restrictions on the authority of the
states to abridge personal rights until the adoption of the post-Civil War amendments: the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. The first ten amendments, adopted in
1791, collectively known as the Bill of Rights, placed limits only upon the federal government.
See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
10. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 10.2, 11.6-.7 (3d ed. 1986);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-2, at 772-74 (2d ed. 1988); see,

e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (Fifth Amendment right against double
jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to jury trial);
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (Sixth Amendment fight to speedy trial);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Sixth Amendment right of confrontation); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949) (Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable search and seizure); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (Sixth Amendment right to public trial). The Fifth Amendment
right to a grand jury indictment remains unincorporated. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884).
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After resolving the question of incorporation, the Court still
needed to decide what additional requirements the Due Process
Clause would impose on the states as a result of its generalized commitment to the principle of fairness." The Court's selective incorporation approach to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
rejected the rigid "total incorporation" approach proposed by Justice
Black. Black would have read the Clause to incorporate only the spe12
cifically enumerated rights contained in the first eight amendments.
In a variety of cases, the Court relied on the general and ambiguous
command of the Due Process Clause to condemn unjust practices in
criminal cases. Sometimes the Court used an open-ended inquiry into
fairness,1 3 and sometimes it used the more focused fairness approach
of Mathews v. Eldridge. 4
In Medina v. California,5 the Court considered what approach it
should apply in considering whether state criminal practices violate
the Due Process Clause. The Court rejected application of Matthews
in the criminal context. Instead, it announced a more narrowly
6
focused historical test derived from Patterson v. New York. '
The issue in Medina concerned the constitutionality of a statutory presumption in favor of the competency of a criminal defendant
that placed the burden of proof on the party challenging the defendant's capacity. The defendant, Teofilo Medina, Jr., was charged with
murder and other related offenses. Prior to his trial, Medina's counsel
11. See Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A
Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957); John E. Nowak, Foreword-Due Process
Methodology in the PostincorporationWorld, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397 (1979).
12. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804-05 (1992) ("It is
tempting, as a means of curbing the discretion of federal judges, to suppose that liberty
encompasses no more than those rights already guaranteed to the individual against federal
interference by the express provisions of the first eight amendments to the Constitution....
But of course this Court has never accepted that view."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Black advocated total incorporation in a
number of cases. E.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (state evidence rules preventing
defendant from impeaching his own witness held to violate due process); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in all criminal cases, including
cases of juvenile delinquency, as a matter of due process); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1966) (prejudicial pretrial publicity held to violate due process); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963) (right to discovery of exculpatory evidence within the possession of the prosecution);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to trial transcript on appeal).
14. The Court invoked the standard of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), in Ake
v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (right to an independent psychiatrist to assist defendant in
considering whether to raise an insanity defense); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.
667 (1980) (applying Mathews to uphold use of magistrates to conduct suppression hearings).
15. 112 S.Ct. 2572 (1992).
16. 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977).
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moved for an evaluation of the defendant's competency. 7 California,
like all other American jurisdictions, prohibits the trial of a mentally
ill defendant who cannot understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or assist counsel in the conduct of the defense. 1 The trial
court granted the motion for a competency determination, and held a
six-day hearing before a jury, as required by California law.1 9 The
trial court instructed the jury, in accordance with the California statute, that the defendant was presumed competent and that he had the
burden of proving his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.2" Although the evidence was conflicting, the jury found
Medina competent to stand trial.2
The court empaneled a new jury for the criminal trial. The jury
found Medina guilty. At a subsequent sanity hearing, held under California law in cases where a defendant enters a plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity, the jury found that Medina had been sane at the
time of the offenses. Following a penalty trial, the jury recommended
and the trial court imposed the death penalty for the murder
convictions.22
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, Medina challenged
the constitutionality of the statute's presumption in favor of competency and its placement of the burden of proof on the issue on a
defendant who asserts his own incompetency. The California
Supreme Court affirmed, noting that "the states ordinarily have great
latitude to decide the proper placement of proof burdens. ' 2a The
court concluded that the statutory presumption and allocation of the
burden of proof did not subject the defendant to "hardship or oppression" because "one might reasonably expect that the defendant and
his counsel would have better access than the People to the facts relevant to the court's competency inquiry. "24
17. Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2574.
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367 (West 1982). See generally Winick, Incompetency to Stand
Trial, supra note 1; Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 921 (1986) [hereinafter Winick, Restructuring Competency].
19. Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2574. Most jurisdictions, unlike California, do not use a jury to
determine competency to stand trial; rather, a trial judge determines competency at a pretrial
hearing. Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 1, at 13.
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367 (West 1982). Other states, by case law or statute, similarly
create a presumption and place the burden of proof on those seeking to rebut it. See, e.g.,
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945 (Anderson 1992); Child v. Wainwright, 148 So. 2d 526, 527

(Fla. 1963); State v. Aumann, 265 N.W.2d 316, 319-20 (Iowa 1978).
21. Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2575.
22. Id.
23. People v. Medina, 799 P.2d 1282, 1291 (1990).
24. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari" and
affirmed.26 Justice Kennedy, writing for a five justice majority,
rejected the contention that the statute's presumption in favor of competency and placement of the burden of proof on the defendant violated due process. 27 The Court considered the standard that should
apply in determining the requirements of due process in the criminal
context and declined to apply the balancing approach of Mathews v.
Eldridge28 that it had used to measure the requirements of due process in a number of areas, including two criminal cases. Instead, the
Court adopted a new, more limited due process approach for criminal
cases that emphasized traditional concepts of fairness. 29 Applying
this new approach, the majority upheld the California statutory
scheme.
Justice Kennedy began his opinion for the majority by recognizing that "[i]t is well established that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the criminal prosecution of a
defendant who is not competent to stand trial."3 The Court's original recognition of this substantive due process limitation on the states
appeared in 1966 in Pate v. Robinson.31 Although dicta, this principle
has been often reiterated and is now so embedded in criminal competency jurisprudence that it is rarely questioned.32 Although holding
that procedural due process requires "further inquiry" when the record presents a reasonable doubt concerning a defendant's competency, 33 the Court had never considered the degree of formality

required by the Due Process Clause for such an inquiry.34 Medina
25. Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 336 (1991).
26. Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2576 (1992).
27. Id. at 2577-81. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Souter joined, wrote a separate
opinion, concurring in the judgment but disagreeing with the majority's approach. Id. at 2581.
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Stevens joined, dissented. Id. at 2583.
28. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
29. Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2577.
30. Id. at 2574 (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.
375 (1966)).
31. 383 U.S. at 378; see Robert A. Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposalforthe Abolition of
the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 66, 76 (1972) (analyzing the statement in Pate as
dicta); Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 18, at 968 (same).
32. See Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 18, at 968; see, e.g., A.B.A.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, Standard 7-4.1(a) (1989).

The courts

consistently treat Pate as gospel, as do most commentators. But see Burt & Morris, supra note
31; Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 18.
33. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180; Pate, 383 U.S. at 385-86. This procedural due process
principle was the holding of Pate. See Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 18, at
968.
34. The Court, however, has determined that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel apply to an evaluation of the
defendant's competency when the statements or information elicited at the examination can be
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presented that opportunity.

Petitioner Medina argued that the Court's decision in Mathews v.
Eldridge35 provided the proper analytical framework for resolving the
procedural due process question. Mathews, which arose in an administrative law context, announced a three-factor balancing test for
determining the level of process that is due in a particular context.36
That test requires consideration of: (1) the private interest affected;
(2) the risk that the procedure challenged will produce an erroneous
deprivation of that interest, and the value of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards in reducing that risk; and (3) the government's

interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that will result from requiring the additional safeguard.3 7

The Court previously invoked the Mathews test in a variety of contexts,38 including cases involving criminal procedure,39 with the result
that the test had emerged as the general approach for measuring the

content of procedural due process."
The Court in Medina, however, backed away from Mathews as
the appropriate test for assessing the validity of state procedural rules
in the criminal process.4 Pointing to the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights for protecting criminal defendants, the
Medina majority concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has "limited operation" in the field of criminal
law.42 In the majority's view, expansion of constitutional guarantees
used against the defendant for any purpose other than the pretrial determination of
competency. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
35. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). For a qualified endorsement of the applicability of the Mathews
balancing test in the criminal procedure area, see Nowak, supra note 11, at 402.
36. For commentary on the Mathews standard, see Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's
Due Process Calculusfor AdministrativeAdjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976); Winick, Voluntary Hospitalization,
supra note 1, at 200-01.
37. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
38. E.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (upholding administrative
hearing for involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to state prisoner); Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982) (standard of proof for termination of parental rights);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1979) (hearing required for civil commitment of
juvenile sought to be hospitalized by parents); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)
(standard of proof for involuntary civil commitment of mental patients).
39. See supra note 14.
40. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 599 (characterizing the Mathews balancing test as "a
general approach for testing challenged state procedures under a due process claim").
41. Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2576-77 (1992). Because the Court based its
decision, at least in part, on federalism, the question remains whether the Matthews test or the
Medina approach will apply in federal due process cases. See United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d
393, 411 n.4 (8th Cir. 1992) (suggesting the Matthews approach would still apply under the 5th
Amendment).
42. Id. at 2576 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)).
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beyond those explicitly enumerated in the Bill of Rights through use
of "the open-ended rubric of the Due Process Clause [would invite]
undue interference with both considered legislative judgments and the
careful balance that the Constitution strikes between liberty and
order."4 3 The Court distinguished the two criminal cases in which it
had applied the Mathews test by observing that "it is not at all clear
that Mathews was essential to the results reached in those cases."'
The Medina majority, therefore, rejected Mathews as the appropriate
test for applying the Due Process Clause in the criminal context.
In place of Mathews, the Court adopted an historical approach
derived from Patterson v. New York.' 5 Under this approach, a state
criminal practice is not subject to correction under the Due Process
Clause "unless 'it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' ",46 The Court thereby signaled a new deference to the states in
matters of criminal procedure by substituting the tradition-based
approach of Patterson for what it considered to be the more intrusive
balancing approach of Mathews.
Justice O'Connor, in a separate opinion on behalf of herself and
Justice Souter, disagreed with the majority's rejection of the Mathews
test and criticized its new approach as inconsistent with precedent
and the nature of the due process inquiry.'
Applying the Mathews
test, however, she concurred in the judgment. Justice Blackmun dissented on behalf of himself and Justice Stevens.4" The dissent criticized the majority's new due process approach and argued that the
statute's placement of the burden of proof on the defendant was
inconsistent with the doctrine of Pate v. Robinson,49 which had recognized that trying an incompetent defendant would violate due process.
III.

CRITICISM OF THE COURT'S NEW DUE PROCESS APPROACH

Four of the Justices in Medina disagreed with the majority's
rejection of the Mathews balancing test. Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justice Souter, would have applied the Mathews standard to uphold
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2577 (discussing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) and Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)).
45. 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977).
46. Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2577 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202 (quoting Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952); Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))).
47. Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2581 (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
48. Id. at 2583 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
49. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
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the California statute.50 Justice O'Connor conceded that Mathews did
not consider the weight that should be given historical practice. But
Mathews failed to take this historical dimension into account, Justice
O'Connor explained, because the case arose "in the context of modern
administrative procedure [where] there was no historical practice to
consider."5 " Justice O'Connor noted that the absence of historical
practice also may occur in the criminal context, as illustrated by
Burns v. United Statei, a recent case involving the federal criminal
sentencing guidelines that had no historical analogue.52 She suggested
that the Mathews balancing test may be helpful in such contexts.5 3
While agreeing that "historical pedigree" can give a procedural rule a
presumption of constitutionality, Justice O'Connor argued that such a
presumption must be rebuttable. 4 Justice O'Connor criticized the
majority's exclusively historical approach as particularly inappropriate for the construction of due process, "perhaps the 'least frozen'
concept of our law-the least confined to history and the most
absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society."'5 5
She suggested that the Court's opinion should be read "to allow some
weight to be given to countervailing considerations of fairness in operation, considerations much like those . . . evaluated in Mathews."'5 6
Indeed, "[a]ny less charitable reading of the Court's opinion would
put it at odds" with many of the Court's criminal cases in which the
justices had relied on due process to require the states to implement
procedural safeguards that were not rooted in historical tradition."
Justice Blackmun, in a dissent joined by Justice Stevens, similarly
criticized the majority's "historical-categorical approach."5 " The dissent illustrated the deficiencies in the majority's approach by explaining that had the Court applied the approach in the foundational
competency-to-stand-trial cases of Pate and Drope, the Court would
50. 112 S. Ct. at 2581-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 2582.
52. Id. (citing Burns v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2182, 2188 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting)).

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (due process right to psychiatric
examination when sanity is significantly in question); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)
(due process right to hearing and counsel before probation revocation); Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (due process right to introduce certain evidence); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (due process right to protection from prejudicial publicity and
courtroom disruptions); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (due process right to discovery
of exculpatory evidence); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (due process right to trial
transcript on appeal)).
58. Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2585 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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not have recognized a defendant's due process right to a competency
hearing. The majority's historical approach would have required a
different result in Pate and Drope because those cases lacked evidence
that the denial of a hearing on competency would offend any deeply
rooted American tradition.5 9 Moreover, Justice Blackmun noted that
Patterson,the case from which the majority derived its tradition-based
approach, did not rely exclusively on tradition. In addition to considering tradition, the Court balanced governmental interests in procedure against the defendant's hardship.'
Although the Medina
majority rejected the Mathews approach in favor of the essentially historical test of Patterson, Justice Blackmun observed that the Court's
statements were not fully consistent with what it actually did in Patterson, nor with its approach in Medina.6 ' The Court's new emphasis
on an exclusively historical approach, therefore, seems artificial in
light of the fact that both the Court in Patterson and the majority in
Medina considered the underlying fairness of the challenged procedural rules. 62 Although the majority purported to disavow Mathews'
applicability to criminal cases, its opinion "ends up engaging in a balancing inquiry not meaningfully distinguishable from that of the
'
Mathews v. Eldridge test it earlier appears to forswear. 63
For the reasons set forth in both the concurring and dissenting
opinions, the majority's rejection of the Mathews balancing test is
inappropriately restrictive. Moreover, an exclusively historical
approach is inconsistent with a large number of the Court's prior
criminal cases. In those cases, cited by Justice O'Connor but ignored
by the majority, the Court held that the Due Process Clause required
procedural safeguards despite a lack of historical tradition. 6 In other
criminal cases not discussed by the Court in Medina, the Court
invoked due process to prohibit unfair practices without any showing
that traditional notions of justice rejected these practices. For example, in United States v. Marion65 and United States v. Lovasco,66 the
Court recognized in dicta that lengthy periods of pre-arrest and preindictment delay in prosecution, although not cognizable under the
Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial, would violate due process if
they prejudiced the defendant and resulted from unjustified actions of
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2585 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 179, 203 n.9, 210 (1977)).
61. Id. at 2584-85.
62. Id. at 2586.
63. Id.
64. See supra note 57.
65. 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971).
66. 431 U.S. 783, 795 (1977).
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the prosecutor. Such periods of delay, neither covered by the right to
speedy trial nor condemned by history,67 do not offend traditional
notions of justice. Yet the Court established a rule limiting them,
thereby extending procedural protections beyond traditional requirements. The Court justified its new rule stating that undue periods of
delay would violate "those 'fundamental conceptions of justice which
lie at the base of our civil and political institutions,' and which define
'the community's sense of fair play and decency.' "68 Absent historical condemnation of these practices, the Court clearly invoked contemporary conceptions of justice to invalidate these practices.
The Court also has relied on due process to condemn various
police evidence-gathering practices that did not exist at common law
or at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, and thus
were not offensive to traditional concepts of justice. In Stovall v.
Denno 69 and Manson v. Brathwaite,70 for example, the Court recognized in dicta that unnecessarily suggestive identification proce-

dures-such as one-person show-ups and single-picture photodisplays-would violate due process if they produced a likelihood of
71
irreparable misidentification. Similarly, in United States v. Russell,
the Court recognized in dicta that certain police entrapment practices
could be so "outrageous" that they violate "that 'fundamental fair67. The Court cited a number of courts of appeals cases applying a due process limit on
such periods of pre-indictment and pre-arrest delay, but none were decided prior to 1952.

Marion, 404 U.S. at 315 n.8.
68. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790 (citation omitted) (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103, 112 (1935); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)); see also id. at 795
("elementary standards of 'fair play and decency' "). Due process also is violated when a
prosecutor deliberately uses perjured testimony to obtain a conviction, Mooney, 294 U.S. at
112 (dicta), or deliberately suppresses evidence favorable to the accused, Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), or fails to divulge evidence within its possession bearing on defendant's
credibility, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972). Similarly, the Court has
employed due process fairness notions to invalidate vindictive resentencing by judges and
recharging by prosecutors designed to discourage defendants from exercising their statutory
right to appeal. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969) ("Due process of law ....
requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first
conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial."); accord Blackledge
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974) (applying Pearce to invalidate vindictive prosecutorial
recharging following a defendant's invocation of his statutory right to a trial de novo). Thus,
the Court has used due process as a general check upon prosecutorial misconduct.
[T]he prosecutor, by accident or by design, may improperly subvert the trial.
The primary safeguard against abuses of this kind is the ethical responsibility of
the prosecutor, who, as so often has been said, may "strike hard blows" but not
"foul ones." If that safeguard fails, review remains available under due process
standards.
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 320 (1973) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
69. 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
70. 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977).
71. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
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ness, shocking to the universal sense of justice,'
mandated by the Due
'72
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

By placing due process limits on police law enforcement practices, Russell invoked a notion of due process first enunciated in
Rochin v. California.73 The Court in Rochin, offended by police use of
a stomach pump to forcibly remove evidence directly from the body
of an accused, invalidated his conviction as a matter of due process. 4
Rejecting the concurrences' suggestions to resolve the case on the
basis of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,"
the Court relied on principles of fairness embodied in the concept of
due process of law. Due process, noted Justice Frankfurter in his
opinion for the Court, requires the states to "respect certain decencies
of civilized conduct" in criminal prosecutions.76 As an "historic and
generative principle, [due process] precludes defining, and thereby
confining these standards of conduct more precisely than to say convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend a 'sense of
justice.' ,,77 The "vague contours" of the Due Process Clause, Justice
Frankfurter wrote, must be interpreted by judges in light of history,
though its content is "not final and fixed." 78 The Court thus adopted
a fluid and flexible conception of due process embracing both traditional and contemporary notions of justice. It rejected "freezing 'due
process of law' at some fixed stage of time or thought . ...

Although the stomach pump was "a contrivance of modern
science,"80 and therefore not prohibited by traditional concepts of
fairness, its forcible use constituted "conduct that shocks the conscience, ' ' 1 violating due process.
The approach of Rochin and these other due process cases cannot be reconciled with the exclusively historic approach of Medina.
These cases did not involve a specifically enumerated guarantee of the
Bill of Rights, but reflect the Court's use of the Due Process Clause
itself to prohibit unfair practices. In these cases, due process func72. Id. at 431-32 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (quoting Kinsella v.
United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960)); see also Hampton v. United States,
425 U.S. 484, 492-93 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (recognizing that police
"overinvolvement" in the crime might violate due process).
73. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
74. Id. at 174.
75. Id. at 174-75 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 173.
77. Id. (quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936)).
78. Id. at 170.
79. Id. at 171.
80. Id. at 175.
81. Id. at 172; see also Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954) (limiting Rochin to
police conduct involving coercion and physical assault).
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tions as a useful safety valve, allowing the Court to police manifestly
unjust criminal procedure, even if not condemned by our history and
tradition. That useful function should not be impeded by an exclusively historical approach to due process adjudication.

The approach of Medina threatens to limit the Court's need for
flexibility in responding to new forms of injustice that lack any histor-

ical antecedent.8 2 Ironically, a recent example of this need occurred

in a competency case decided only one month before Medina. In Riggins v. Nevada,"a the Court held that the trial of a defendant who had

been forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs violated due process. The Court analyzed the defendant's substantive due process
interest in being free from unwanted medication and the procedural
fairness of his resulting trial. The medication administered to the
defendant during his trial altered his demeanor and ability to participate in the proceedings, presenting a strong possibility of prejudice.8 4
Justice Kennedy, author of the majority's opinion in Medina, wrote a

concurring opinion in Riggins that expressed greater concern than the
Riggins majority about the potentially prejudicial effects of these
drugs on a defendant's demeanor and trial abilities.8 5 Indeed, Justice

Kennedy proposed the additional requirement that the prosecution
must demonstrate the absence of prejudicial effects in order to justify
antipsychotic medication. 6 Riggins provided the first occasion for
the Court to consider the effect of antipsychotic medication on the
fairness of a criminal trial.8 7 As a result, no historic condemnation of

involuntary use of these drugs on criminal defendants existed.
Neither the majority nor Justice Kennedy, however, hesitated to
invalidate the practice even absent traditional disapproval. Both
82. As Dean Kadish stated in an early discussion of the meaning of due process:
(In the light of its ultimate relation to the preservation of the conditions of a free
society, the residuary procedural guarantee of due process is readily seen to be
incompatible with changeless meanings. Freezing the meaning of due process,
which in the final analysis is more a moral command than a strictly jural precept,
destroys the chief virtue of its generality: its elasticity. Future generations would
become bound to the perceptions of an earlier one; the experience that develops
with changing modes of governmental power, unpredicted and unpredictable at
an earlier time, as well as the deeper insights into the nature of man in organized
society that are gained in continually changing social contexts, would become
irrelevant.
Kadish, supra note 11, at 341 (footnote omitted).
83. 112 S.Ct. 1810 (1992).
84. Id. at 1813.
85. Id. at 1817-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 1817.
87. This was not surprising because these drugs are a relatively recent innovation, having
first been introduced in the early 1950s. See Bruce J. Winick, Psychotropic Medication and
Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 769, 778.
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opinions concluded that the practice offended due process because it
placed such a prejudicial burden on a defendant without sufficient justification. The Court in Riggins considered possible justifications for
involuntary medication, but found the record insufficient to support
any of them.s In its discussion of the state interests that might justify
involuntarily medicating the defendant during trial, the Court balanced the interests of the state against the interests of the defendant,
including the defendant's interest in the fairness and accuracy of the
trial. Although the Court in Riggins did not mention Mathews v.
Eldridge, its balancing approach was more consistent with the standard of Mathews than with the Court's new tradition-based approach
in Medina.
The new approach of Medina would also deprive the Court of
needed flexibility to consider the constitutionality of historically
accepted practices that come to be regarded as unjust in light of evolving concepts of fairness. For example, in Witherspoon v. Illinois,89 the
Court considered a challenge to jury selection practices in capital
cases that, although criticized by commentators, 90 were accepted at
the time. Under these practices, prosecutors used the challenge for
cause to remove all potential members of the jury with scruples
against capital punishment. Witherspoon limited the use of the challenge for cause in death penalty cases to jurors whose opposition to
capital punishment was so strong that they could not find the defendant guilty or impose a death sentence. 91 Any wider use of the challenge, the Court found, would violate due process by "stacking the
deck" against the accused. 92 Because the trial in Witherspoon
occurred before the Court applied the Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 93 the Court
invoked generalized due process notions of fairness to invalidate a
widely tolerated use of the challenge for cause. Under an exclusively
historical approach, such flexibility to condemn a practice that produced capital juries biased in favor of the death penalty may not have
been available.
88. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815-16.
89. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
90. See Walter E. Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurorsfor Scruples Against Capital
Punishment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEX. L. REV. 545, 549-52
(1961). See generally Bruce J. Winick, ProsecutorialPeremptory ChallengePractices in Capital
Cases: An Empirical Study and a ConstitutionalAnalysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 40-62 (1982).
91. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 513-14.
92. Id. at 522-23.
93. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Court has also invoked due
process to require that, in appropriate circumstances, the trial judge permit questioning at voir
dire concerning juror bias. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
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The Court also needs flexibility to reconsider the constitutionality of practices that a prior Court approved. Sometimes the Court
must overrule a prior due process precedent that approved a practice
now thought constitutionally unfair. In such a case, not only is there
an absence of tradition condemning the practice in question, but a
Supreme Court decision approving it. Jackson v. Denno9 4 presented
such a situation. Jackson involved a constitutional challenge to the
practice, specifically approved by the Court eleven years earlier,9" of
allowing the jury that determines guilt or innocence also to determine
the voluntariness of a confession. Although the Court had previously
upheld the practice, it became concerned that a jury might conclude
that an involuntary confession was true, and as a result, would be
unable to ignore it in its determination of the defendant's guilt. 96 The
Court therefore overruled its precedent and found that the practice
did not satisfy due process.97 The force of precedent provides a
restraining influence on the Court in these circumstances. The new
approach of Medina, however, would be unduly constraining, imprisoning the Court in its own precedents. Once the Court had approved
a particular practice, the approach of Medina would seem to insulate
the practice from reconsideration by a future Court.
The restricted due process approach of Medina thus impinges on
the Court's historic role in constitutional adjudication in criminal
cases. Medina is inconsistent with many of the Court's prior due process decisions, as well as with several more recent criminal cases in
which the Court explicitly applied the Mathews balancing approach. 98
It also is inconsistent with the Court's approach in other, non-criminal due process contexts. 99 The Court in Medina sought to limit its
analysis to the criminal due process context, observing that the Due
Process Clause has "limited operation" in the field of criminal law in
view of the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights for
criminal defendants." ° The majority concluded that use of the Due
Process Clause to expand constitutional criminal protections beyond
those explicitly enumerated in the Bill of Rights would involve
"undue interference" with both "considered legislative judgments"
and the "careful balance that the Constitution strikes between liberty
94. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
95. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
96. Jackson, 378 U.S. at 382.
97. Id. at 377, 387.
98. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
100. 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2576 (1992).
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and order."' 0 '
The Court's analysis, however, cannot be so limited. The Court
sometimes must make similar due process determinations in the civil
procedure context. In the civil area, like its criminal counterpart, the
Bill of Rights enumerates specific guarantees. 102 As a result, the use
of the Due Process Clause to expand procedural protections in the
civil area also would invite "undue interference" with both legislative
judgments and the balance struck by the Constitution. Yet in the civil
context, the Court has not hesitated to use the Due Process Clause to
impose additional requirements on the states, sometimes interfering
with "considered legislative judgments," based upon the Court's
evolving notions of fairness.
A line of cases in which the Court has determined the validity
under the Due Process Clause of a plaintiff's method of providing
notice to the defendant of the commencement of a lawsuit illustrates
such action by the Court in the civil context. In Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,"' the Court held that the Due Process
Clause requires service of process through means reasonably calculated to afford actual notice to the defendant. °4 If plaintiff had an
alternative, reasonably practicable method of service that more likely
would produce actual notice than the method of service used, then the
service used would violate due process. 0 5 Emphasizing practicability,
the Court sought to balance considerations of fairness against considerations of cost. The due process inquiry is not a quest for perfect
notice, but rather for reasonable notice at reasonable cost. The
approach adopted in Mullane is similar to the balancing test adopted
in Mathews v. Eldridge. Both tests involve an explicit balancing of the
interests of the parties and a rough cost/benefit analysis of the value
of the procedural safeguard in question.
Moreover, like Mathews, but unlike Medina, traditional concepts
of fairness did not limit the Court's approach in Mullane. Mullane
invalidated notice by publication as inconsistent with due process
when plaintiff knew or could reasonably ascertain the address of the
defendant. 106 Service by publication, however, was a traditional mode
of service that, at least in in rem cases, was widely used at the time of
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court endorsed ser101. Id.
102. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII (protecting the right to trial by jury).
103. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

104. Id. at 314.
105. Id. at 315.

106. Id. at 318-19; accord, Tulsa Professional Collection Serv. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988);
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
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vice by publication in such cases in Pennoyer v. Neff 10 in 1877 and
specifically upheld it in 1890 in Arndt v. Griggs.'0 " Even though this
method of service was approved by tradition, the Court in Mullane
used the Due Process Clause to condemn service by publication for
defendants with known addresses. Similarly, in a 1982 application of
Mullane, the Court held that posting of a summons on the door of the
abode of the defendant was not a constitutionally permissible method
of service."° Even though the Court traditionally approved notice by
posting, it used the Due Process Clause to invalidate this method of
service. The Court's new tradition-based approach in Medina therefore is inconsistent with its due process methodology in civil procedure cases.
Medina's exclusively historical approach, as Justice O'Connor
noted, is particularly inappropriate for construction of the vaguely
worded Due Process Clause, "perhaps the least frozen concept of our
law-the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful
social standards of a progressive society."" Even more than other
constitutional provisions, the Due Process Clause contains ambiguous
and open-ended language capable of broad construction to effectuate
its purposes as they may be conceived and reconceived over time, in
light of the experiences and exigencies of succeeding generations. The
vague provisions of the Constitution "were purposely left to gather
meaning from experience.""' The Constitution's adaptability to
changing times makes it a document "intended to endure for ages to
come."'12 The Due Process Clause, "the least specific and most comprehensive protection of liberties," ' 1 3 is one of a number of broad and
general phrases in the Constitution that exist as "organic living institutions, '" I I4 for which an exclusively traditional approach seems particularly inappropriate.
[T]he very breadth and generality of the [Fourteenth] Amendment's provisions suggest that its authors did not suppose that the
Nation would always be limited to mid-nineteenth century conceptions of "liberty" and "due process of law" but that the increasing
experience and evolving conscience of the American people would
107. 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714, 721-22 (1877).
108. 134 U.S. 316 (1890); see also Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911); Cunnius v. Reading
Sch. Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1905).
109. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
110. Medina, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2582 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
112. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.).
113. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.).
114. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes, J.).
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add new "intermediate premises."'

5

An exclusively traditional approach to due process is inconsistent
with this conception of the Due Process Clause. Moreover, the
majority's conclusion that the Due Process Clause has limited operation in the criminal law area in view of the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights seems puzzling. As the Ninth
Amendment makes clear, the guarantees explicitly enumerated in the
Bill of Rights were not intended to be exhaustive."1 6
The majority's approach in Medina, therefore, is unduly restrictive, preventing the Court from playing its historical role in due process adjudication. Tradition, of course, is relevant to whether a
challenged practice satisfies due process, even if not dispositive of the
issue. 7 Tradition may, as Justice O'Connor suggests, justify a presumption in favor of a procedural practice, but that presumption must
be rebuttable." 8 The Court should not be prevented in appropriate
115. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 175 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
ALEXANDER
MCCLOSKEY,

M.

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 102-09 (1962); ROBERT G.
THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 15 (1960) (The Constitution was

"[c]onceived in ambiguity," the framers intending that it mean "whatever the circumstances of
the future will allow it to mean."); Leonard W. Levy, Introduction to AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS

2 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966) ("The framers

also had a genius for studied imprecision or calculated ambiguity. . . . [The Constitution]
thereby permitted, even encouraged, nay necessitated, continuous reinterpretation and
adaptation.").
116. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). James Madison, its
draftsman, described the circumstances giving rise to the need for the Ninth Amendment as
follows:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular
exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not
placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those rights
which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the
General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most
plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of
rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have
attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth
resolution [the Ninth Amendment].
I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 439 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1834); see also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1965)) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("[The Ninth Amendment] was proffered to quiet expressed fears that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover all essential rights and that the specific mention of certain rights would
be interpreted as a denial that others were protected.") (footnotes omitted); JOHN H. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 34-38
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

(1980); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CON626-27 (5th ed. 1891); Russell L. Caplan, The History and

Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223, 227-28, 264-65 (1983); Symposium,
Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 37 (1988).
117. See Kadish, supra note 11, at 343 ("Solutions of the problems of another day are useful
but certainly not determinative of today's problems.").
118. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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cases from considering whether contemporary notions of fairness sufficiently condemn a practice honored by history so that it no longer
satisfies due process. Because the Court's approach in Medina, if
taken literally, would foreclose such an inquiry, it is inconsistent with
the normative role of the Court in construing an organic, living Constitution.1 19 By placing exclusive emphasis on traditional concepts of
fairness, the new approach threatens to freeze procedural practices in
a nineteenth century mold, preventing the progressive evolution of
procedural justice.12 0 To the extent that Medina's test prevents the
Court from reconsidering the fairness of an historically approved
practice or from condemning new forms of injustice, the Court should
reject it.
The Mathews test, by contrast, is less rigid. If a party challenging a procedural practice can show that an alternative practice would
sufficiently increase the accuracy of adjudication to justify the fiscal,
administrative, and social costs of its imposition, Mathews would condemn the practice even if historically supported. Although the Court
should use Mathews sparingly-only in cases in which the balance
tips decisively against a challenged practice supported by traditionthe very notion of due process of law contemplates that the Court
consider whether the practice so offends contemporary notions of fairness that it should be condemned as unconstitutional.
In light of these difficulties with Medina's exclusively historical
test, it is not clear that the Court should construe the test literally. As
Justice Blackmun noted, the majority in Medina, by considering the
fairness of placing the burden of proof on the defendant, did not take
its own formulation of the new test literally. 21 Moreover, in other
contexts where the Court has used tradition-based standards for measuring due process, it has looked beyond considerations of tradition.
In the area of jurisdiction, for example, the Court has read the Due
Process Clause to limit a state's assertion of jurisdiction over a non119. Indeed, the Medina test's quest for historic condemnation of a practice either denies or
disguises the Court's normative role in giving meaning to the phrase "due process of law." See
Kadish, supra note 11, at 339-40 (a "purely historical search can be expected to do little more
than further obscure the judicial value-choosing inherent in due process adjudication, which

can proceed with greater expectation of success if pursued openly and deliberatively rather
than under disguise.").
120. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) ("To believe
that this judicial exercise of judgment could be avoided by freezing 'due process of law' at some
fixed stage of time or thought is to suggest that the most important aspect of constitutional

adjudication is a function for inanimate machines and not for judges ....

); Kadish, supra note

11, at 343 ("[a]cceptable resolutions of due process predicaments are not likely to be
forthcoming from the application of pre-formed molds, which by definition ignore the unique

character in which each generation's problems are presented.").
121. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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resident when jurisdiction would offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."' 122 Although stressing tradition, the
Court recognized that" '[t]raditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient
forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional
heritage."1 2 3 In Shaffer v. Heitner,1 24 the state court had asserted
jurisdiction over the defendant by attaching the defendant's property
which was located in the state but unrelated to the claim. The
Supreme Court determined that quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, although
traditionally accepted,1 25 no longer conformed to evolving conceptions of fairness and was inconsistent with due process. Although the
Court's new approach in Medina places greater emphasis on tradition,
it seems perhaps inevitable that in the future, the Court will consider,
as it recently did in Riggins v. Nevada, the fairness of the challenged
practice in light of the respective interests of the parties, even if such a
balancing approach is not performed by using the specific formulation
of Mathews.
IV.

ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE ISSUE OF
INCOMPETENCY

A.

The Constitutionalityof the CaliforniaStatute

Although the Court's rejection of the Mathews balancing test for
criminal cases is questionable, the Court's decision to uphold the constitutionality of placing the burden of proof on the defendant to
demonstrate incompetency is correct. Both the historical approach
adopted by the majority in Medina and the Mathews test support the
majority's conclusion.
1.

APPLICATION OF THE COURT'S NEW APPROACH

As the majority observed, although the rule barring trial of an
incompetent defendant has deep roots in common law, "no settled
tradition" exists concerning how the burden of proof should be allocated in a proceeding to determine competency.1 26 The Court noted
the lack of clarity on this issue in the common law at the time of the
122. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations omitted).
123. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977). For differing conceptions of the role of
tradition in applying the International Shoe standard, compare Burnham v. Superior Court,
495 U.S. 604, 622-27 (1990) with id. at 628-40.
124. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
125. See, e.g., Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714
(1877).
126. Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2577-78 (1992).
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adoption of the Constitution, as well as in contemporaneous English
practice. 127 Early nineteenth century American decisions display
divergent views on the burden of proof issue. 128 Moreover, the Court
observed, contemporary statutes and cases reflect "no settled view"
on the matter. 129 Consequently, the majority could find no historical
basis for concluding that placing the burden of proving incompetency
0
on the defendant violated due process.13
Although beyond the scope of the tradition-based test, the majority then considered the fairness of placing the burden of proof on the
defendant. Allocating the burden to the defendant, as the Court
noted, only affects the determination of competency in a "narrow
class of cases" in which the evidence is in equipoise. 13 1 The Court
reiterated the principle that due process guarantees a defendant the
right not to be tried while incompetent and imposes on the states the
obligation to provide procedures adequate to protect that right. 132
However, the majority concluded that once a state provides a defendant access to procedures for determining competency, due process
does not "require[ ] the State to assume the burden of vindicating the
defendant's constitutional right by persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant is competent to stand trial."' 133
The petitioner asserted that an incompetent defendant does not
possess the ability to adduce evidence of his incompetency; thus, placing the burden of proof on him would deny him a fair opportunity to
demonstrate that he was incompetent. 134 Rejecting this contention,
the Court found that the defendant's right to the assistance of counsel'3 5 and the availability of psychiatric evidence mitigated the
problems an incompetent defendant might encounter in carrying the
127. Id.at 2578.
128. Id. (citing United States v. Chisholm, 149 F. 284, 290 (S.D. Ala. 1906) (defendant
bears burden of raising a reasonable doubt as to competence); State v. Helm, 61 S.W. 915, 916
(Ark. 1901) (burden on defendant to prove incompetency)).
129. Id. (comparing CONN. GEN.. STAT. § 54-56d(b) (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. TIT, 50,
§ 7403(a) (Purdon Supp. 1991) (placing burden of proof on party raising the issue) with
Wallace v. State, 282 S.E. 2d 325, 330 (Ga. 1981); State v. Aumann, 265 N.W.2d 316, 319-20
(Iowa 1978); State v. Chapman, 721 P.2d 392, 395-96 (N.M. 1986); Barber v. State, 757
S.W.2d 359, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc) (burden of proof may be placed on
defendant) and with Diaz v. State, 508 A.2d 861, 863-64 (Del. 1986); Commonwealth v.
Crowley, 471 N.E.2d 353, 357-58 (Mass. 1984); State v. Bertrand, 465 A.2d 912, 916 (N.H.
1983); State v. Jones, 406 N.W.2d 366, 369-70 (S.D. 1987) (burden of proof rests with the
prosecution)).
130. Id.
131. Id.at 2579.
132. Id. (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172-73 (1975)).
133. Id.
134. See United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 988 (3d Cir. 1976).
135. Medina, 112 S.Ct. at 2580 (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-71 (1981)).
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burden of proof.1 36 The Court noted that any impairment in the ability of the defendant to assist counsel is probative evidence that he

meets that standard. Furthermore, the Court observed, "counsel will
often have the best informed view of the defendant's ability to partici-

pate in his defense." 137 The Court found that due process does not
"require a State to adopt one procedure over another on the basis that
it may produce results more favorable to the accused."' 38 The Court
concluded that "a reasonable opportunity" to demonstrate incompetency satisfies due process. 139 The Court found the California procedure "constitutionally adequate" to guard against the trial of an
incompetent defendant," 4 and held that the state's placement of the
burden of proof on the defendant did not offend due process.
2.

APPLICATION OF THE MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE APPROACH

The approach of Mathews v. Eldridge calls for a broad balancing
of the parties' interests in the procedural safeguard in contention.
The Court must weigh the value of that safeguard to the individual
against the fiscal, administrative, and social costs of its imposition.
Due process, therefore, does not mandate a quest for the optimal level
of procedural fairness. Fairness imposes costs, and the insight of the
Mathews approach was that the Court must consider these costs when
determining the level of fairness that the Constitution requires.' 4 '
Mathews thus calls for a rough cost/benefit analysis of the safeguard
claimed to be constitutionally required: would imposing the safeguard in question sufficiently increase the accuracy and fairness of the
proceedings to justify the added costs and burdens it would produce?
Four of the justices in Medina disagreed with the new due process approach adopted by the majority for determining the level of
procedure required by the Constitution in criminal cases. Justices
O'Connor and Souter, who concurred in the Court's judgment,' 42 and
Justices Blackmun and Stevens, who dissented,1 43 favored continued
use of the Mathews approach. Although both the concurrence and
the dissent applied Mathews to the burden of proof question presented
136. Id.; see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (right to psychiatric assistance in
determining whether to raise insanity defense).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2581 (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975)).
141. The Mathews standard replaced the relatively unlimited, open-ended fairness inquiry
that had previously prevailed. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that
an evidentiary hearing is required before terminating welfare benefits).
142. Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2581 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 2583 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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in Medina, they reached contrary conclusions concerning the constitutionality of California's placement of the burden on the defendant
to demonstrate his own incompetency to stand trial.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion reached the same conclusion as the majority by applying the Mathews approach. 1" Justice
O'Connor stated that the "main concern" of the prosecution in these
cases is that a defendant will feign incompetency to avoid trial.' 45
This concern would be heightened, Justice O'Connor suggested, if the
burden of proof were on the prosecution. In such a case, she reasoned, a defendant would have less incentive to cooperate with a psychiatric evaluator because an inconclusive examination would make it
difficult for the prosecution to carry the burden.146 She also suggested
that placing the burden on the prosecution would provide the defendant with a disincentive to cooperate in making available friends or
family members who might have relevant information concerning the
defendant's mental state.'47 Justice O'Connor noted that states may
respond to these considerations by concluding that "a more complete
picture" of the defendant's mental condition will be obtained by placing the burden of proof on the defendant, thereby giving him "the
incentive to produce all the evidence in [his] possession."' 48 Because
placing the burden on the defendant will thereby increase the overall
availability of information on the competency question, Justice
O'Connor suggested that the resulting increase in accuracy "may outweigh the danger that in close cases a marginally incompetent defend144. Id. at 2581-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 2582. Justice O'Connor previously has expressed concern about the possibility
that defendants will feign incompetency in order to gain the benefit of various legal rules. Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 429 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he potential for false
claims and deliberate delay in this context is obviously enormous.") (referring to incompetency
to be executed). Justice O'Connor's concern about the ability of defendants to feign
incompetency successfully may be exaggerated. Although unstructured clinical evaluations
may not adequately detect malingering and deception, structured clinical interviews and the
use of a variety of objective psychometric measures that have recently been validated provide a
higher degree of accuracy in the ability of clinicians to detect malingering. See, e.g., R.
Michael Bagby et al., Detection of Dissimulation with the New Generation of Objective
PersonalityMeasures, 8 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 93 (1990); Kirk Heilbrun et al., An MMPI-Based
Empirical Model of Malingering and Deception, 8 BEHAV. SC. & L. 45 (1990); James R. P.
Ogloff, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Malingering and Deception, 8
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 27 (1990); Richard Rogers et al., The SIRS as a Measure ofMalingering: A
Validation Study with a CorrectionalSample, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 85 (1990); David Schretlen
& Hal Arkowitz, A Psychological Test Battery to Detect Prison Inmates Who Fake Insanity or
Mental Retardation, 8 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 75 (1990). The clinical evaluator can also improve
accuracy by obtaining third party information (from hospital or other records or individuals)
to provide a method of external verification.
146. Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2582.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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'
ant is brought to trial."149
Moreover, placing the burden of proof on
the prosecution will not necessarily increase the reliability of the competency determination process. Therefore, Justice O'Connor concluded that, under Mathews, the equities did not sufficiently weigh in
the defendant's favor to rebut the presumption of constitutionality
given to the California procedure.150
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun also applied the Mathews balancing test, but reached the opposite conclusion. The dissent
expressed concern that, under the California procedure upheld by the
Court, defendants will be subjected to trial even though the evidence
concerning their incompetency is inconclusive. 151 Justice Blackmun
warned that placing the burden on the defendant would produce "a
systematic and unacceptably high risk that persons will be tried and
convicted who are unable to follow or participate in the proceedings
'
In his view, due process should require
determining their fate."152
that the state bear the burden of proving that the defendant is competent to stand trial.
One factor overlooked by Justice Blackmun, however, limits the
risk that placing the burden on the defendant will produce the conviction of incompetent defendants. Competency is a fluctuating state. A
defendant's condition may change over time. 15 3 This imposes a continuing burden on the trial court to reconsider the issue of competency if at any time, even after the court has found the defendant
competent, his conduct raises a reasonable doubt about his continued
competency.' 5 4 Indeed, the Court in Drope cautioned that "a trial
court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that
would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence
to stand trial."' 55 Thus, a defendant found competent even though
the evidence at the competency hearing was inconclusive may again
raise the issue if during trial his condition renders him unable to fol149. Id. at 2583.

150. Id.
151. Id. at 2587 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
152. Id.

153. CHARLES W. LIDZ ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN
PSYCHIATRY 198-99 (1984); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 123 (1983); Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth,
Clinical Issues in the Assessment of Competency, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1462, 1465 (1981);
Joanne Lynn, Informed Consent: An Overview, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 29, 35-36 (1983); Winick,
Restructuring Competency, supra note 18, at 966.
154. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(b) (requiring competency determination if reasonable
grounds to question the defendant's competency emerge "at any material stage of a criminal
proceeding.").
155. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975).
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low and participate in the proceedings. A pretrial competency determination constitutes, at best, a prediction about how the defendant
will perform at his future trial. If the trier of fact predicted the
defendant's competence on the basis that the evidence concerning his
incompetency was inconclusive, but events during the trial suggested
that this prediction was incorrect, the court should order a mistrial
and a new competency determination.1 56 If during the trial counsel
perceives that his client's impairment is interfering with his ability to
communicate or to follow and understand the proceedings, the attorney can bring concrete examples of such incapacities, more persuasive
than previous, largely hypothetical predictions, to the court's attention in support of a motion for a new competency determination.
These concrete examples of the defendant's impairment, unavailable
at the initial competency determination, will enable a defendant previously unable to bear his burden of proof to carry that burden. The
risk of erroneously convicting an incompetent defendant is therefore
considerably less than Justice Blackmun feared.
Another issue of competency bears on the risk of error-the
competency of defense attorneys. Although the Sixth Amendment
guarantees the effective assistance of counsel,1 - 7 the quality of the
criminal defense bar is so varied that, at least in some areas, the promise of the Sixth Amendment remains unfulfilled. Many criminal
attorneys, including public defenders, are excellent-talented, sophisticated lawyers who zealously represent their clients' interests. Sadly,
however, some are not. Some have not kept up with the rapidly
changing developments in the law; some suffer under case loads too
heavy to devote sufficient time to a particular case; some are incompetent and even unethical. As with competency to stand trial, we can
best understand the notion of competency of counsel in terms of a
continuum of competency. Where we place the line for incompetency
is, of course, a normative legal question. In a system that prizes finality of adjudication, it is not surprising that the law presumes the competence of a properly licensed attorney and places a high burden on a
convicted defendant to demonstrate his representation was constitutionally ineffective. 5 s Indeed, much of the Supreme Court's criminal
procedure jurisprudence builds on the assumption that counsel in
criminal cases are competent. 59
Although this assumption is generally warranted, there is no
156. See Hamm v. Jabe, 706 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1983).
157. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).

158. See id. at 687-91.
159. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (waiver of Fifth Amendment claim

when counsel fails to make a contemporaneous objection).
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blinking the reality that some defense attorneys fall far short of the
standard. Moreover, the risks increase in cases involving mentally ill
defendants, both because many attorneys do not understand the complexities of the law or the clinical issues in this area, and because their
clients are particularly vulnerable to malpractice. Notwithstanding
these risks, it is sensible to assume the competency of counsel. The
arguments in support of placing the burden of proof of incompetence
to stand trial on the defendant assume that the defense attorney is
competent to represent his client's interests and will do so vigorously.
Only then will allocating the burden of proof to the defendant not
sacrifice the accuracy of an incompetency determination. When
counsel is uninformed about clinical matters or the law in this area, or
unwilling or unable to devote the necessary time and energies, the
accuracy in the adjudication of competency decreases. As a result, a
trial court should be particularly sensitive to the possible ineffectiveness of counsel, and when appropriate, should question counsel to
ensure that the defendant's interests are properly represented. Counsel for an impaired client bears a special degree of professional responsibility. 16 A court must be especially alert to the potential breakdown in the adversary system when defense counsel is ineffective in
representing a mentally ill defendant.
Justice Blackmun also premised his dissent on the notion that
because the Constitution prohibits trial of an incompetent defendant,
the courts cannot constitutionally try a defendant whose evidence of
incompetency is inconclusive. 161 A procedural rule is not unconstitutional, however, because it fails to eliminate the possibility of an erroneous deprivation of constitutional rights. In general, procedural
rules should effectuate substantive rights, and should not frustrate
their protection. A variety of pleading and evidence rules, however,
sometimes produce results that do not fully promote substantive
rights. Nevertheless, accomplishment of goals of efficiency, economy,
and avoidance of delay justify these rules. Placing the burden of proof
of incompetency on the defendant may result in some incompetent
defendants facing trial because the evidence of incompetency is inconclusive. This does not necessarily justify the conclusion that the prosecution should bear the burden of proof.
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has upheld the allocation
of burdens of proof or has set standards of proof in ways that would
similarly produce the risk of erroneous deprivation of substantive con160. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.3, 1.14 (1983).
161. Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2583 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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stitutional rights. For example, in Lego v. Twomey,' 62 the Court
upheld a practice under which, at a pretrial suppression hearing in a
criminal case, the state bore the burden of proof by a preponderance
of the evidence that a challenged confession was voluntary under the
Fifth Amendment. The defendant argued that unless the Court
required a standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt," courts
might admit confessions even though there was a reasonable doubt
concerning their voluntariness. The defendant further argued that
this result was inconsistent with his Fifth Amendment freedom from
compulsory self-incrimination and his due process right to have the
state prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Although Justice
Brennan, in dissent, found the argument persuasive,"' the Court
explicitly rejected it.' 64
Similarly, in Addington v. Texas, 65 the Court held that to justify
involuntary civil commitment of a mental patient, the state must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the patient satisfies the
state's statutory commitment criteria.1 66 The Court rejected the
patient's contention that due process required the more rigorous
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Although an individual has a
constitutional right to liberty unless the individual meets the civil
commitment criteria, the procedures approved by the Court did not
eliminate the risk of error in the application of those criteria. It is
possible that courts applying the Addington clear and convincing standard could commit individuals who are not mentally ill or do not
otherwise meet the criteria while courts might not commit these individuals under a reasonable doubt standard.
In Ford v. Wainwright,1 67 the Court held that execution of an
incompetent inmate would violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment. The Court suggested that a state
might allocate to the death row inmate both the burden of production
concerning his mental illness, and the burden of proof of his incompetency to be executed.1 68 Although placing the burden of production
and proof on the prisoner creates a risk that the state will execute
incompetent defendants as a result of their inability to produce sufficient evidence concerning their incompetency, the Court's suggestion
implied that this would not offend due process.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

404 U.S. 477 (1972).
Id. at 494.
Id. at 487-89.
441 U.S. 418 (1979).
Id. at 432-33.
477 U.S. 399 (1986).
Id. at 416-17 (dicta); see Winick, Competency to be Executed, supra note 2.
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These cases illustrate that procedural rules do not offend due
process simply by producing the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a
constitutional right. Even under Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court
could not invalidate a procedural rule simply because it produced the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of a constitutional liberty. Rather,
under Mathews, the Court would balance the respective interests of
the parties to ascertain whether the defendant's proffered substitute
procedure, allocating the burden of proof to the prosecution, would
further his interest in avoiding trial while incompetent sufficiently to
justify the costs that the procedure would impose on the state.
As Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion demonstrated, application of the Mathews balancing test in Medina would lead to the
same result as that reached by the majority because of the potential
decrease in the reliability of the competency process produced by
placing the burden on the prosecution. Justice O'Connor suggested
that the principal reason motivating the state to place the burden of
proof on the defendant was the desire to minimize the possibility of
the defendant's feigning incompetency in order to avoid trial. 169 A
rule placing the burden on the prosecution, she feared, would give the
defendant a disincentive to cooperate with the psychiatric evaluation
and with the state's access to family and friends who might have
information bearing on his competency. The California Supreme
Court in Medina made a similar point, suggesting that "one might
reasonably expect that the defendant and his counsel would have better access than the People to the facts relevant to the court's competency inquiry."1 10 In Justice O'Connor's view, this consideration tips
the balance required by Mathews in favor of upholding the approach
taken by the California statute.
The majority's conclusion in Medina therefore seems justified.
The risk seems small that allocating the burden of proof of incompetence to the defendant will produce an erroneous deprivation of his
right not to be convicted while incompetent. Moreover, by producing
a disincentive to the production of evidence in the defense's control,
allocating the burden to the prosecution could increase the risk of
inaccurate competency determinations, resulting in finding competent
defendants who are incompetent. This type of error may impose serious burdens on both defendants and the state.17 ' The Court's conclusion therefore would seem proper under an application of the
Mathews balancing test that the majority rejected.
169. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
170. People v. Medina, 799 P.2d 1282, 1291 (Cal. 1990).
171. See infra part IV.B.3.
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B.

The Wisdom of Allocating the Burden of Proof to the Party
Asserting Incompetency to Stand Trial
The Court's conclusion sustaining the constitutionality of the
California statute appears correct under both a tradition-based
approach and the more fairness-oriented standard of Mathews. Apart
from the question of constitutionality, it is appropriate to consider the
wisdom of the California statutory scheme. Although "wisdom" in
this sense is a question of legislative judgment rather than of constitutional adjudication, a consideration of the reasonableness of that judgment gives a better perspective to the Court's conclusion in Medina.
Three factors-fairness, probability, and policy--often invoked by
appellate courts in allocating burdens of proof, support the Court's
conclusion to uphold the California statute.
1.

FAIRNESS

In allocating burdens of pleading and proof, appellate courts
often invoke the consideration emphasized by Justice O'Connor in her
concurring opinion-that the defendant has greater access to the facts
concerning his incompetency. 172 In a classic article on allocating burdens of pleading and proof, Professor Edward Cleary identified this
consideration as one of the three principle factors that courts should
consider in making burden allocation decisions.1 73 Cleary called this
consideration "fairness." He suggested that when evidence relating to
a particular matter lies more within the control of one party, the burden of proof on that matter, other things being equal, should be allo74
cated to him.'
Because the defendant and his counsel have greater control over
the evidence concerning incompetency than the prosecution, the
defense should bear the burden of proof. Placing the burden on the
defendant would not be unfair to him because he has greater access to
the information necessary to carry the burden. It would avoid unfairness to the prosecution, which otherwise might be hampered in its
ability to adduce the necessary evidence to carry the burden. Moreover, because the defendant possesses greater control over the evidence than the prosecution, placing the burden on the defense should
increase the reliability of the competency determination process.
172. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 641 (1980) (allocating the burden of pleading
good faith qualified immunity in a civil rights action against a public official to the defendant

based in part on the conclusion that "whether such immunity has been established depends on
facts peculiarly within the knowledge and control of the defendant.").
173. Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12
STAN. L. REV. 5 (1959).
174. Id. at 12.
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2.

PROBABILITY

"Fairness" is not the only consideration that enters into the
determination of where to allocate the burden of proof. Professor
Cleary identified two additional considerations, which he called
'
"probability" and "policy." 175
Cleary suggested that courts make a
rough estimate of the likely probabilities concerning resolution of the
outcome of the issue and that courts allocate the burden of proof,
other things being equal, "to the party who will be benefitted by a
departure from the supposed norm." 176
In the context presented in Medina, the question is how probable
it is that a defendant who undergoes a formal competency evaluation
will be found incompetent. Although the Court in Medina did not
discuss this consideration, it supports the reasonableness of the balance struck by the California statute. Under Pate v. Robinson 177 and
Drope v. Missouri,178 due process requires trial judges to make a formal competency determination whenever the facts and circumstances
present a reasonable doubt about the defendant's competency. 179 In
practice, trial judges order a formal competency evaluation in virtually every case in which doubt exists about competency.1 0 "Several
studies have concluded that the vast majority of defendants inappropriately are referred for competency evaluations and have suggested
that the competency process is often invoked for strategic purposes
.... ,"81 Perhaps because the competency process is so easily
175. Id. at 11-12.
176. Id. at 12-13.
177. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
178. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
179. Drope, 420 U.S. at 172; Pate, 383 U.S. at 385.
180. Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 18, at 925; see, e.g., RONALD ROESCH
& STEPHEN L. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 192 (1980) (reporting on a survey
of judicial attitudes in North Carolina).
181. Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 18, at 933; see, e.g., A.B.A. STANDING
COMMITTEE ON ASSOCIATION

MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE

introduction at 7.142-43, 7.162 (1st tent. draft 1983)

[hereinafter ABA TENTATIVE DRAFT]; BRUCE J. ENNIS & RICHARD D. EMERY, THE RIGHTS

OF MENTAL PATIENTS 102-03 (rev. ed. 1978); ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 180, at 49-50,
192-98; David E. Bennett, Competency to Stand Trial: A Call for Reform, 59 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 569, 572 (1968); Paul A. Chernoff & William G. Schaffer,
Defending the Mentally Ill: Ethical Quicksand, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 505, 515-16 (1972);
Gerald Cooke et al., FactorsAffecting Referral to Determine Competency to Stand Trial, 130
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 870, 874 (1973); Stuart E. Eizenstat, Mental Competency to Stand Trial, 4
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 379, 380 (1968); Stephen L. Golding et al., Assessment and
Conceptualizationof Competency to Stand Trial, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 322, 332 (1984);
Abraham L. Halpern, Use and Misuse of Psychiatry in Competency Examinations of Criminal
Defendants, 5 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 123, 124 (1975); A. Louis McGarry, Demonstrationand
Research in Competency for Trial and Mental Illness: Review and Preview, 49 B.U. L. REV. 46,
47-50 (1969); Ronald Roesch & Stephen L. Golding, Treatment and Disposition of Defendants

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:817

invoked, a larger number of defendants evaluated for competency are

found competent-as many as 96% or more in some jurisdictions,182
and probably no less than 75% in most. 8 3 National estimates suggest

that only about 25% of those evaluated for competency are found
incompetent. 184 Using these estimates,185 it is more probable than not
that a defendant subjected to a formal competency determination will
be found competent. Thus, "probability" would support placing the
burden of proof of incompetency on the party (defense or prosecuFoundIncompetent to Stand Trial: A Review and a Proposal,2 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 349,
366 (1979); Saleem A. Shah, Legal and Mental Health System Interactions: Major
Developments and Research Needs, 4 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 219, 242-43 (1981); Ralph
Slovenko, The Developing Law on Competency to Stand Trial, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 165, 165
(1977); Henry J. Steadman & Jeraldine Braff, Crimes of Violence and Incompetency Diversion,
66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73, 73 (1975); Henry J. Steadman & Eliot Hartstone,
Defendants Incompetent to Stand Trial, in MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS:
PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 39, 42 (John Monahan & Henry J.
Steadman eds., 1983); Alan A. Stone, Comment, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 61, 62 (1978); David
B. Wexler et al., Special Project-The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and
Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 161-62 (1971).
These sources suggest that both sides often invoke the competency evaluation to obtain
delay; prosecutors do so to avoid bail or an insanity acquittal, or obtain hospitalization that
might not otherwise be possible under the state's civil commitment statute; defense attorneys
do so to obtain mental health recommendations for use in making an insanity defense, in plea
bargaining, or at sentencing. Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 18, at 933.

182. LABORATORY OF COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY, HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL,
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL AND MENTAL ILLNESS 64, 65 (DHEW Pub. No. (ADM) 74103, 1974) (Massachusetts); Richard H. Bendt et al., Incompetency to Stand Trial: Is
Psychiatry Necessary?, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1288 (1973) (Massachusetts).
183. ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 180, at 48-49 (North Carolina); Robert L. Goldstein,
"The Fitness Factory,"Part P"The Psychiatrist'sRole in Determining Competency, 130 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1144, 1145-46 (1973) (New York); Andrew L. Laczko et al., A Study of Four
Hundred and Thirty-Five Court-Referred Cases, 15 J. FORENSIC SCI. 311, 320 (1970);
Steadman & Hartstone, supra note 181, at 41.
184. HENRY J. STEADMAN, BEATING A RAP?: DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO

STAND TRIAL 4 (1979); Steadman & Hartstone, supra note 181, at 39-41; Winick,
Restructuring Competency, supra note 18, at 925.
185. The estimates referred to are based on competency evaluations by clinicians and not
necessarily on judicial determinations of competency in contested cases. When a trial judge
orders a competency evaluation, two or more psychiatric (or psychological) evaluators
interview the defendant and submit a report on his competency to the court. When these
reports are consistent, the parties often stipulate to the reports, thereby avoiding a formal
hearing. Allocation of the burden of proof becomes important only in cases where there is
such a contested hearing. The above data suggests that only 25% of defendants evaluated for
competency are found incompetent, but does not differentiate between cases with and without
a contested hearing. Although these estimates do not provide a fully reliable basis for
conclusions about the results of contested hearings, they provide reasonable support for the
conclusion that it is more likely than not that defendants who require such a formal judicial
determination of competency will be found competent. At the very least, these studies provide
a reasonable basis for judicial estimates of probability in such circumstances for purposes of
applying Professor Cleary's analysis. See Cleary, supra note 173, at 12 (referring to a "judicial,
i.e., wholly nonstatistical, estimate of the probabilities of the situation").
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tion) that asserts the more improbable event, i.e., that the defendant is
incompetent. This is precisely how the California statute involved in
Medina allocated the burden.
3.

POLICY

According to Professor Cleary, courts should also consider policy in allocating burdens of proof.1 1 6 Allocation of the burden of
proof affects various social policies."8 7 Professor Cleary quotes Julius
Stone's admonition that "the courts should not essay the impossible
task of making the bricks of judge-made law without handling the
straws of policy." ' 8
The Court did not base its determination in Medina on an analysis of the social policy implications of the allocation of the burden of
proof of incompetency. Perhaps the majority omitted the social policy consideration because it rejected the Mathews balancing test as the
proper standard. Mathews more explicitly requires an analysis of policy considerations. The Mathews test contemplates judicial assessment of the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards and the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.1 8 9 Applying this standard, the Court often has alluded to the social cost of
requiring additional procedural protections, expressing concern, for
example, with the adverse impact on family values of imposing an
adversarial hearing when parents seek to commit their minor children
to mental hospitals,19 0 with the impact on professional education of
imposing an adversarial hearing when a medical school faculty dismisses a medical student because of deficiencies in his clinical skills,' 9'
and with the impact on the educational process of imposing formal
hearings as a prerequisite to short-term suspension from public
school. 92
186. Cleary, supra note 173, at 11.
187. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)
(allocating the burden of proof to plaintiffs to effectuate Congressional policy).
188. Cleary, supra note 173, at 12 (quoting Julius Stone, Burden of Proofand the Judicial
Process, 60 L.Q. REV. 262, 283 (1944)).
189. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
190. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 610 (1979).
191. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978).
192. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1975).
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Reducing the Burdens of the Incompetency-to-Stand-Trial
Doctrine

What policies are affected by allocating the burden of proof on
the issue of incompetency to stand trial? The most obvious concern is
that placing the burden on the defendant creates the risk that courts
will find some truly incompetent defendants competent and require
them to stand trial even though they cannot effectively understand the
proceedings or consult with counsel. As demonstrated earlier, however, that risk may be small because allocation of a preponderance of
the evidence burden will affect only a small category of marginally
impaired defendants. Moreover, the trial court must reconsider the
competency question if evidence of the defendant's impairment
emerges at trial. Therefore, placing the burden of proof on the
defendant does not frustrate the protective policies underlying the
incompetency-to-stand-trial doctrine.
The Court in Medina reiterated the oft-quoted dicta from Pate v.
Robinson that the trial and conviction of an incompetent defendant
would violate due process. 193 For defendants who are able to carry
the burden of demonstrating their incompetency by a preponderance
of the evidence, the California statute will not undermine fairness and
accuracy of adjudication. Moreover, even when defendants cannot
carry this burden, these values probably will not be undermined.
Like other constitutional rules, the incompetency doctrine sometimes produces unintended consequences. Even though the doctrine
protects defendants who are severely impaired by mental illness, it
raises significant problems and has been criticized as imposing serious
burdens on defendants and high costs on the states.194 Although originally designed to protect the defendant, the doctrine is frequently so
burdensome to incompetent defendants that the ABA Committee that
developed the Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards suggested
that defense counsel may conclude that it is in their clients' best interests not to raise the issue. 195
193. 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2574, 2579, 2581 (1992) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162
(1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)). For analysis showing that the language in Pate
was dicta, see NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 49 (1982); Burt &
Morris, supra note 31, at 76; Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 18, at 968-70.
194. Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 18, at 925, 928-49 (analyzing the
burdens and costs imposed by the incompetency doctrine); Bruce J. Winick, Incompetency to
Stand Trial: An Assessment of Costs and Benefits, and a Proposalfor Reform, 39 RUTGERS L.
REV. 243 (1987).
195. According to the Committee:
Because of the sometimes severe consequences historically attendant upon a
determination of incompetence defense counsel may conclude that it is in the
defendant's best interest to proceed to trial although technically the defendant

1993]

MEDINA V. CALIFORNIA

An adjudication of incompetency is thus, at best, a mixed blessing for the defendant. To a great extent, the concept of incompetency
to stand trial is based on myth and sanist stereotyping concerning the
mentally ill. 96 Moreover, the concept is based also on an unrealistic
view of the competency of non-mentally ill defendants, many of
whom possess a low level of ability to understand and participate
meaningfully in the criminal process. The burdens and costs imposed
by the incompetency doctrine make it appropriate for judges and legislators to seek to minimize its negative consequences. One way of
accomplishing this is to define narrowly the class of cases in which a
defendant may be found incompetent to stand trial. However, the
broad standard for incompetency approved by the Court in Dusky v.
United States' 97 and followed in substance in all jurisdictions, 98
appears to be constitutionally required. As a result, narrowing the
standard itself may not be constitutionally permissible. Another way
of accomplishing this result is to place the burden of proof on the
party asserting that the defendant is incompetent. Grossly incompetent defendants may require the protections afforded by the incompemight be incompetent to stand trial. For example, the length of involuntary
commitment for treatment to restore competence may extend well beyond the
possible maximum sentence for a relatively minor offense; a finding of mental
illness could result in stigma which the defendant finds more opprobrious than
the stigma of conviction; the evaluation itself may require the defendant to reveal
to a court-appointed expert information which the defendant would prefer to
keep secret; in a case in which the probable penalty is a relatively minor fine,
introduction of the cumbersome incompetence evaluation proceedings appears an
unnecessary expenditure of systemic resources. The defendant may even prefer
to be punished by being sentenced to a prison than to be committed to a mental
hospital for treatment, given the inadequate conditions in many public mental
institutions. The defense attorney may also feel, if the case against the defendant
is weak or if the defense does not depend upon the competence of the client, that
the defense would prevail at trial despite the defendant's incompetence.
ABA TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 181, Standard 7-4.2(c) commentary at 7.160 (footnotes
omitted).
196. See Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 18, at 970-75. Michael Perlin
defines "sanism" as "irrational, unconscious, bias-driven stereotypes and prejudices," similar
to those exhibited in cases involving racist, sexist, and other bigoted decisionmaking. Michael
L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization,and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization,
28 Hous. L. REV. 63, 91-93 (1991); see also Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 S.M.U. L.
REV. 373 (1992); Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of
Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625 (1992); Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman,
Sanism, Social Science, and the Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, 11
BEHAV. Sci. & L. (forthcoming 1993).
197. 362 U.S. 402, 420 (1960) (whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he
has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him").
198. Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 1, at 5; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1367 (West 1982).
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tency doctrine. But those whose mental illness only marginally
impairs their ability to understand and participate in the proceedings
may actually be better off if required to face and resolve their criminal
charges more quickly. Postponing the criminal trial until after a
sometimes lengthy period of hospitalization and treatment may not
increase these defendants' ability to obtain better results in the criminal process. Therefore, it may be appropriate to limit the incompetency-to-stand-trial status to severely impaired defendants. Placing
the burden of proof on the party asserting the defendant's incompetence can help minimize the inappropriate use of the incompetency
doctrine for defendants who are not as severely impaired by moving
those who are only marginally incompetent from the incompetent to
the competent category. On the other hand, placing the burden of
proof on defendants who assert incompetency should not affect the
result reached in cases where the impairment is severe. Only in cases
in which the evidence is so equivocal or inconclusive that the trier of
fact concludes that incompetency is no more likely than competency,
will placing the burden on the party asserting incompetency make a
difference. As a matter of social policy, it may be beneficial to use the
burden of proof on the issue to treat marginal cases as competent and
allow the criminal process for such defendants to proceed.
b.

Facilitating the Speedy Disposition of Criminal Charges

Other relevant social policy considerations may point in the same
direction. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to speedy
trial reflects a strong social policy in favor of the expeditious resolution of criminal charges.' 99 Unlike many of the Bill of Rights protections afforded criminal defendants, the speedy trial right serves not
only the interests of the defendant in avoiding delay in the resolution
of charges, but also the interests of society. 2°° The lengthy trial delays
that often follow a finding of incompetency to stand trial may be
accompanied by the death or disappearance of witnesses, the fading of
memories, and the disappearance of evidence. Both the prosecution
and defense suffer burdens that may significantly impede a just and
accurate resolution of the case.
Aside from its potential impact on the accuracy of adjudication,
a lengthy delay may compromise the basic policies underlying the
199. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690-91 (1992);
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
200. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 519 ("In addition to the general concern that all accused
persons be treated according to decent and fair procedures, there is a societal interest in
providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests
of the accused.").
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criminal law. If the defendant is guilty, delay diminishes the potential
for rehabilitation. The passage of time between the criminal act and
the application of punishment weakens the deterrent effect of the
criminal sanction. Delay also frustrates the interests of victims in seeing that justice is done.
If the defendant is innocent, undue delay will be especially prejudicial. Defendants found incompetent typically are held in custody,
rather than released on bail or on their own recognizance. 20 1 The
conditions of confinement in the typical forensic facility may be so
oppressive that defendants prefer prison punishment.20 2 For the
increasing number of defendants charged with minor offenses who are
found incompetent, the duration of incompetency commitment may
exceed the period of penal confinement they would have received if
convicted.20 3 The stigma of unresolved charges can be severe, often
costing a defendant his job and injuring his reputation. The anxiety
and concern produced by delaying the trial may create emotional
problems for the defendant and his family that persist beyond his
vindication.
Because an adjudication of incompetency produces delay, placing
the burden of proof on the party contesting competency serves the
policy in favor of speedy disposition of criminal charges. Allocating
the burden of proof in this manner would affect only marginally
impaired defendants. The courts would find these defendants competent and would have the opportunity to resolve their charges more
expeditiously. The delays of an incompetency determination may be
appropriate for severely impaired defendants, but more difficult to justify for those whose impairment is only marginal. These marginally
impaired defendants, as well as the public, may benefit more from a
speedy resolution of their charges than from a postponement of trial
and a lengthy incompetency commitment.
c.

The Therapeutic Impact of Allocating the Burden of
Proof on Incompetency

Another area of social policy not considered by the Court in
Medina involves the impact of its procedural ruling on therapeutic
values. Particularly when the Court decides issues of mental health
law, the impact of its decisions on therapeutic considerations should
201. Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 18, at 946-47.
202. See, e.g., ABA TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 181, Standard 7-4.2(c) commentary at
7.160; Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 18, at 942.
203. See, e.g., ABA TENTATIVE DRAFr, supra note 181, Standard 7-4.2(c) commentary at
7.160; Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 18, at 942.
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not be ignored. This insight is at the core of what David Wexler and I
call "therapeutic jurisprudence. '"2" In this section, I assess the therapeutic impact of Medina, concluding that therapeutic considerations
also support the Court's result.
Placing the burden of proof on the party asserting incompetency
may have positive therapeutic value. Placement of the burden of
proof will make a difference only in cases in which the evidence concerning competency is so evenly distributed that the trier of fact cannot conclude that it favors one determination rather than another. In
cases in which the evidence even slightly favors one conclusion, the
allocation of the burden of proof, because it must be carried by a preponderance of the evidence, will not affect the outcome. In cases like
Medina, in which the defendant asserts that he is incompetent, placing the burden on him will thus affect only a presumably small category of cases in which the defendant is marginally incompetent.
There also may be therapeutic value in avoiding application of
the incompetency label to marginally impaired defendants. Not only
might such labeling have a negative impact on their mental health,
but withholding the incompetency label from these defendants may
present therapeutic opportunities. Defendants in this category are
impaired by mental illness and probably could benefit from treatment.
Even if their impairment is not clearly sufficient to meet the standard
for incompetency, a brief period of mental health treatment might
improve their ability to face their charges more effectively by increasing their understanding of the proceedings and their capacity to participate with counsel in decisionmaking. When a court finds a
marginally incompetent defendant competent as a result of his inabil204. The theory of therapeutic jurisprudence suggests the need to study the therapeutic
implications of various legal rules and practices. The theory focuses attention on the
therapeutic dimension, an often neglected ingredient in the calculus necessary to perform a
sensible policy analysis of mental health law and practice, and requires systematic empirical
examination of this dimension. See DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991) [hereinafter WEXLER & WINICK, ESSAYS]; David B.
Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, The Potential of Therapeutic Jurisprudence:A New Approach to
Psychology and the Law, in LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: THE BROADENING OF THE DISCIPLINE
211 (James R. P. Ogloff ed., 1992); David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence as a New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 979 (1991) [hereinafter Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceas a New
Approach]; David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Criminal
Justice Mental Health Issues, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 225 (1992). To
identify the therapeutic dimension as a significant factor is not, of course, intended to suggest
that it should trump other considerations. There may be countervailing normative
considerations that outweigh the therapeutic consequences of a particular rule. Therapeutic
jurisprudence is not a method of determining which factor should predominate in
decisionmaking. Rather, it merely seeks to raise questions that call for a more complete
analysis of the relevant considerations.
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ity to carry the burden of proof, his counsel still may be able to seek a
trial continuance for a brief period of treatment. Courts frequently
grant continuances to physically ill or disabled defendants who
request brief trial delays to undergo treatment. Such continuances are

a reasonable accommodation of conflicting interests. Courts' freely
grant such continuances unless they believe the defendant is feigning
illness to delay the trial, or is otherwise acting in bad faith. If the
court already has heard sufficient evidence concerning the defendant's
mental illness to believe that he is not fabricating his condition, and if
a brief period of treatment seems likely to be beneficial to the defendant and to increase his ability to function at trial, the court may be

willing to grant a continuance of reasonable duration, even though the
court has found the defendant competent.2 °5
In some cases, a defense attorney will anticipate that the court

will find the mentally ill defendant competent because evidence of
incompetence does not meet the preponderance standard. In such a
case, defense counsel could seek a trial continuance by proposing a
reasonable treatment plan worked out in advance with the defendant
and an appropriate clinician. The place of treatment, of course,
would depend on the defendant's bail status. If the defendant is in
custody, the defendant could receive treatment either in jail or in a
hospital prison ward or other secure mental health facility; if released,
the defendant could receive treatment in the community on an outpatient or voluntary inpatient basis.
The literature on the psychology of choice 20 6 suggests that the
205. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983) ("[B]road discretion must be granted trial
courts on matters of continuances.
...) (citation omitted). For the suggestion that trial
continuances replace the formal competency process now existing for defendants asserting
their incompetency as a bar to trial, see Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 1, at
25-27; Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 18, at 979-83; see also Burt & Morris,
supra note 31, at 67 (suggesting a more general replacement of the incompetency plea with a
system employing trial continuances and eventual trials of defendants remaining impaired after
a six-month period).
206. For discussion of the psychological literature on the effect of choice on motivation and
performance, and the implications for law and social policy in a variety of areas, see Winick,
Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 1, at 46-53; Winick, Voluntary
Hospitalization, supra note 1, at 192-99; Bruce J. Winick, Harnessing the Power of the Bet:
Wagering with the Government as a Mechanism for Social and Individual Change, 45 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 737, 752-72 (1991) [hereinafter Winick, Wagering with the Government];
Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A TherapeuticJurisprudence
Analysis, 17 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY (forthcoming 1993). This literature is based on studies
involving populations that are not as impaired as mentally ill defendants found incompetent to
stand trial. Whether conclusions about the relationship between patient choice and the efficacy
of treatment can be generalized to the more impaired population discussed here is an open
question deserving investigation. Therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to identify such open
empirical questions and to call for their analysis by social scientests. See supra note 204.
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potential for successful treatment of marginally incompetent defendants will increase when the defendants are involved in treatment planning and accept treatment voluntarily rather than as a result of court
coercion. These defendants would have been subjected to coercive
treatment had they been found incompetent and committed to a
forensic facility. Many of these facilities are inadequately staffed and
funded. In addition, defendants may spend lengthy periods confined
there before they are restored to competency. Defendants who perceive a strategic advantage in delaying or avoiding trial may artificially prolong their commitment. Because their trials will be resumed
upon their restoration to competency, a disincentive to a positive
treatment response may result. A defendant who has been found
competent because he has failed to carry his burden of proof, however, will not be subject to this disincentive. If the court grants a
requested trial continuance to such a defendant to allow for needed
treatment, the commencement of his trial will not depend upon a
favorable response to treatment. As a result, to the extent that the
defendant perceives that a successful response to treatment will
improve his functioning, and chances for a more favorable outcome at
trial, an incentive to improvement will exist.
In addition, to further increase the efficacy of treatment, the
defendant and the court could enter into an agreement linking treatment to the continuance. Under such an agreement, the defendant
receives the continuance in exchange for participation in a treatment
program with periodic progress toward trial capacity, perhaps based
on a schedule of target goals and dates. Tying treatment participation
and response to the continuance can be seen as a "contingency contract," a device that, according to psychological theory, should
enhance the efficacy of the treatment program.20 7 In cases involving
defendants seeking an incompetency adjudication, placing the burden
of proof on them may have the effect of creating therapeutic
opportunities.
In cases in which the state asserts that the defendant is incompetent, even though the defendant wishes to be deemed competent, plac207. See Winick, Wagering with the Government, supra note 206 (analyzing contingency
contracting as a mechanism for accomplishing individual and social change); see also WEXLER
& WINICK, ESSAYS, supra note 204, at 314-17 (suggesting the use of contingency contracting in
the incompetency to stand trial context); David B. Wexler, Health Care Compliance Principles
and the Insanity Acquittee Conditional Release Process, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 18 (1991)
(proposing the use of contingency contracting in the insanity acquittee conditional release
process); Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceas a New Approach, supra note 204, at
998-1000 (proposing contingency contracting in the incompetency to stand trial treatment
process).
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ing the burden of proof on the state might have an even greater
therapeutic potential. In a small percentage of cases, the defendant,
although mentally ill, does not assert incompetency, but the prosecution or the court raises the issue.2°8 When the prosecution asserts that
the defendant is incompetent, it will bear the burden of proof under
the California statute.2 °9 Although the Court in Medina did not discuss the question, the Court would presumably uphold assignment of
the burden of proof to the prosecution when it raises the issue over the
defendant's objection. Placing the burden on the state would be beneficial to the defendant not merely because it facilitates the objective of
pleading guilty or standing trial, but also because it minimizes the
particularly severe and unfair burdens of an unwanted incompetency
determination. 2 10 Because the benefits of the incompetency doctrine
may not outweigh the burdens it imposes on defendants wishing to
stand trial notwithstanding their impairment, states should limit
involuntary incompetency to grossly impaired defendants.
Placing the burden of proof on the state in such cases is one way
of increasing therapeutic value. Moreover, defendants for whom the
allocation of the burden of proof to the prosecution may affect the
result (presumably only a small category of marginally impaired
defendants) also would experience the same therapeutic advantages
and opportunities available to those who assert their incompetency.
When the state bears the burden of proof in this context, the court
will find marginally incompetent defendants competent, and will permit these defendants to plead guilty or stand trial according to their
wishes. These defendants will be able to accept needed mental health
treatment before, during, or after their trial, on a voluntary basis, free
of the potential disincentives to successful treatment faced by their
counterparts, those defendants adjudicated incompetent.
Marginally competent defendants may benefit from treatment,
largely to the extent that they desire it. Having their criminal charges
disposed of, either by trial or guilty plea, will remove potential obstacles to successful treatment. Placing the burden of proof on the party
asserting incompetency will increase the ability of defendants to deal
effectively with their mental health problems free of the pressures of
208. Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 1, at 8-9; Winick, Restructuring
Competency, supra note 18, at 951.
209. Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2574 (1992) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369(0
(West 1982)).
210. See Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 18 (criticizing the incompetency
process when applied involuntarily and suggesting that defendants wishing to do so with the
approval of counsel, should be permitted to waive their incompetency and plead guilty or
stand trial in an impaired state).
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pending criminal charges. Thus, whether the defendant asserts that
he is incompetent or that he is competent, the California statute,
approved by the Court in Medina, can produce a beneficial therapeutic effect.
A variety of social policies thus provide support for placing the
burden of proof on the party asserting incompetency. These social
policies and the previously discussed considerations of fairness and
probability make the allocation of the burden by the California statute
a reasonable one. Although the approach used by the majority in
Medina may be questioned, the result reached by the Court is correct.
V.

THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF COMPETENCY

In addition to its effect on defendants in the criminal process, the
Court's decision in Medina endorsing the presumption in favor of
competency may have significance for the future of mental health law
in general. The California statute erected a presumption in favor of
competency and placed the burden of proof on the party asserting
incompetency. By specifically approving this statutory presumption,
the Court appears to be moving in a different direction from the
21
approach it took in Zinermon v. Birch.
In broad dicta in Zinermon, the Court seemed to question the
presumption of competency. While considering the competency of a
mental patient to consent to voluntary hospitalization, the Court suggested that
even if the State usually might be justified in taking at face value a
person's request for admission to a hospital for medical treatment,

it might not be justified in doing so without further inquiry as to a
mentally ill person's request for admission and treatment at a
mental hospital.212
The Court's statement went considerably beyond the facts of the case,
which involved a grossly incompetent patient who thought the mental
hospital he was entering was heaven.213 While it is appropriate to
require further inquiry on the question of competency when a patient
exhibits signs of gross impairment, most mental patients seeking voluntary hospitalization, even though mentally ill, are not incompetent
to make that decision. The required inquiry is justified for patients
such as the one in Zinermon because the evidence of his impairment
exhibited upon admission destroyed the presumption of competency
211. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
212. Id. at 133 n.18. For an analysis showing that this statement was dicta, see Winick,
Voluntary Hospitalization,supra note 1, at 180-81.
213. Winick, Voluntary Hospitalization,supra note 1, at 181.
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to which patients are generally entitled. However, requiring such an
inquiry for all mental patients seeking hospital admission suggests
that mental illness per se destroys the presumption of competency.
Not only does the breadth of the Zinermon dicta threaten the
voluntary hospitalization process,2 14 but it questions one of the most
important reforms of modem mental health law and our historic
political and constitutional commitment to the principle of individual
autonomy. In a society deeply committed to principles of individual
autonomy and self-determination,2 1 it is appropriate that people be
presumed competent. Moreover, it is essential that any legal status of
incompetency that deprives an individual of freedom to act for himself be narrowly defined.2 16
Respect for individual autonomy is an important policy served
by statutes like the California one that explicitly create a presumption
in favor of competency. Indeed, even in the absence of a statute,
courts have frequently recognized this presumption to protect and
promote autonomy values.2 17 Moreover, these values underlie the
broad scholarly support that exists in favor of the presumption.2 18
In addition to the political value our society traditionally has
attributed to the principle of individual autonomy, psychological considerations support the presumption in favor of competency. Principles of psychology suggest that presuming individuals competent
rather than incompetent fosters their functional abilities and pro214. See id. at 191-99; Bruce J. Winick, Voluntary HospitalizationAfter Zinermon v. Burch,
21 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 1 (Sept. 1991).
215. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 1, at 17-18.
216. See generally Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and PsychologicalPerspectives, 37
VILL. L. REV. 1705 (1992) [hereinafter Winick, On Autonomy].
217. See, e.g., Lotman v. Security Mut. Lifc Ins. Co., 478 F.2d 868, 873 (3d Cir. 1973);
Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1970); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361,
1363-64 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980) (en banc),
vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Child v. Wainwright, 148 So. 2d 526,
527 (Fla. 1963); Howe v. Commonwealth, 99 Mass. 88, 98-99 (1868); Lane v. Candura, 376
N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978); Grannum v. Berard, 422 P.2d 812, 814 (Wash.
1967).
218. See, e.g., SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 341

n.167, 375 (3d ed. 1985); 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBS. IN
MED. & BIOMED. & BEHAV. RES., MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A REPORT ON THE
ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENTPRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 3, 56 (1982); THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES:

FORENSIC ASSESSMENT AND INSTRUMENTS 314 (1986); George J. Annas & Joan E.
Densberger, Competence to Refuse Medical Treatment: Autonomy vs. Paternalism, 15 U. TOL.
L. REV. 561, 575 (1984); Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities
to Consent to Treatment, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1635 (1988); David B. Wexler, Reflections on
the Legal Regulation of Behavior Modification in InstitutionalSettings, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 132,
136 (1975); Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 1, at 22-23 & n.19, 35-37.
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motes their psychological well-being. 219 A sense of competency and
self-determination is a prerequisite for psychological health. 220 Denying people the opportunity to feel competent and self-determining (the
effect of labeling them incompetent) "undermines people's motivation, learning, and general sense of organismic well-being." 221 Indeed,
the stress of losing the opportunity to be self-determining may cause
severe somatic malfunctions" and even death.222 Treating people as
incompetent and denying them control over important aspects of their
lives may cause them to develop what psychologist Martin Seligman
called "learned helplessness" 22 3-a generalized feeling of ineffectiveness that debilitates performance and undermines motivation and perceptions of competence. A presumption in favor of competency,
particularly one that places the burden of proof on those who raise the
competency question, can be defended as a mechanism for promoting
the psychological health of individuals especially vulnerable to the
negative effects of labeling them incompetent.
By questioning the presumption in favor of the competency of
the mentally ill, Zinermon presents unintended antitherapeutic consequences. The Court's dicta also runs counter to one of the most significant developments in modern mental health law. Under the
approach that once prevailed in American law, an adjudication of
incompetency rendered an individual generally incompetent. 224 But
219. See Winick, On Autonomy, supra note 216 (analyzing the psychological value of
choice); Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 1, at 46-53 (same); Winick,
Voluntary Hospitalization,supra note 1, at 192-99 (same).
220. Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The Empirical Exploration of Intrinsic
MotivationalProcesses, in 13 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 39, 61, 72
(1980).
221. EDWARD L. DECI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 209 (1980)
(discussing studies); see also Bruce J. Winick, Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling
(manuscript on file with author) (exploring the negative psychological effects of labeling an
individual incompetent and denying him the ability to be self-determining).
222. DECI, supra note 221.
223. See SHARON S. BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A
THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 378 (1981); MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS:
ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEATH (1975); MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, HUMAN

HELPLESSNESS (1980); Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique
and Reformulation, 87 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 49 (1978); Deci & Ryan, supra note 220,
at 41-42, 60-63, 67; Steven F. Maier & Martin E.P. Seligman, Learned Helplessness: Theory
and Evidence, 105 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 33 (1976); Jerry W. Thornton & Paul D.
Jacobs, Learned Helplessness in Human Subjects, 87 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 367
(1971); see also DECI, supra note 221; cf Julian B. Rotter, Generalized Expectancies for
Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcement, 80 PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS 1
(1966) (viewing behavior as a function of individual expectancies concerning whether
outcomes are determined by the individual's own actions or by external forces beyond his
control).
224. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK
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the law has rejected that notion of general incompetency in favor of
an approach requiring adjudications of specific incompetency. 225
Under the more modem view, the court determines an individual
incompetent to perform only particular tasks or roles, such as to

decide on hospitalization, to manage property, to consent to treatment, or to stand trial. 226 An adjudication of specific incompetency

does not render the individual legally incompetent to perform other
tasks or to play other roles. Indeed, modem law presumes that people
are competent to make decisions unless they have been adjudicated

incompetent.227 This general presumption of competency applies to
the mentally ill as well as to the medically ill, even to those who have
been involuntarily committed under the state's parens patriae power
on the basis that they are incompetent to make the hospitalization
decision for themselves.2 28
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 219 (2d ed. 1991); PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED
CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 82 (1987); BRAKEL ET AL., supra note
218, at 185, 258, 438-39; DAVID B. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAW 40 (1981); Allan M.
Tepper & Amiram Elwork, Competence to Consent to Treatment as a Psycholegal Construct, 8
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 205, 207 (1984); Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note
1, at 22-23.
225. E.g., Rogers v. Commissioner, 458 N.E. 2d 308, 312-13 (Mass. 1983); State ex rel.
Jones v. Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883, 894-95 (Wis. 1987); APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra
note 224, at 219; APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 224, at 82-83; BRAKEL ET AL., supra note
218, at 185, 405-07 (table 7.2, col. 1); RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY
AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 289 (1986); Tepper & Elwork, supra note 224, at 207;
Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 1, at 23.
226. APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 224, at 82-83; TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F.
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 71-72 (2d ed. 1983); BRAKEL ET AL., supra
note 218, at 185 & n.73; THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC
ASSESSMENT AND INSTRUMENTS 314-15 (1986); Tepper & Elwork, supra note 224, at 207-08;
David B. Wexler, The Structure of Civil Commitment: Patterns,Pressures,and Interactionsin
Mental Health Legislation, 7 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 2 (1983); Winick, Competency to Consent
to Treatment, supra note 1, at 23.
227. See supra notes 224-226 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 846 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated
& remanded on othergrounds, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 657-59 (1st
Cir. 1980), vacated & remanded on other grounds sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1971); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915,
935-36 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd
sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Anderson v. State, 663 P.2d 570,
573-74 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973 (Col. 1985) (en banc); In re
Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 747 n.5 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979); Gundy v. Pauley, 619 S.W.2d 730, 731
(Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Rogers v. Commissioner, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1983); Rivers v.
Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341-42 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla.
1980); State ex reL Jones v. Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883, 890-91, 894-96 (Wis. 1987);
BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 218, at 258; James C. Beck, Right to Refuse Antipsychotic
Medication: Psychiatric Assessment and Legal Decision-making, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 368, 369 (1987); National Task Force of the National Center for State
Courts' Institute on Mental Disability and the Law, Guidelines for Involuntary Civil
Commitment, 10 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 409, § E7, at 466, 468 n.23
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Zinermon's broad language questioning the presumption of competency for the mentally ill was therefore troubling on a number of
accounts. Even more perplexing was the fact that the Court's analysis
was based on an artificial distinction between medical and mental illness, and confusion about the nature of mental illness and its effects
on competency. 229 By questioning the presumption of competency,
the Court's language ran counter to the direction of a generation of
mental health law reform. It echoed an earlier time when mental illness was equated with general incompetency, a view that modem case
law and statutory reform have consistently repudiated. Ironically, the
Court's statements could help perpetuate the stigma that long has
plagued the mentally ill, and contribute to the feelings of helplessness
and lack of self-efficacy that keep many mental patients from dealing
effectively with their social and health problems. Presuming the mentally ill to be competent and treating them as such is more consonant
with the goal of restoring them to the greatest degree of functional
normality to which they are capable. Moreover, a broad reading of
Zinermon's language could significantly jeopardize the liberty of mentally ill persons to exercise a wide variety of rights and make decisions
in an unlimited number of areas.
A presumption in favor of competency is not, of course, a conclusive presumption. When reasonable doubt about competency is
raised, due process requires a fair determination of the issue. 230 But
the presumption is not shattered by the emergence of such doubt; it
continues to inform the adjudication of the issue by placing the burden of proving incompetency on the party challenging the presumption. When that party fails to demonstrate incompetency by a
preponderance of the evidence, the presumption remains unrebutted
(commentary) (1986); Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 1, at 37-40;
Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: Current State of the Law and
Beyond, in THE RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION 7, 17-18 (David Rapoport
and John Parry eds., 1986); see also FLA. STAT. § 745.43 (Supp. 1990) ("Incapacity may not be
inferred from the person's voluntary or involuntary hospitalization for mental illness .... ).
The mere presence of psychosis, dementia, mental retardation, or "some other form of mental
illness or disability is insufficient in itself to constitute incompetence." APPELBAUM &
GUTHEIL, supra note 224, at 220.
Similarly, mental illness alone does not justify a determination that a criminal defendant
is incompetent to stand trial. E.g., Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 872 (1962); Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523, 1572 (S.D. Fla. 1988);
ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 180, at 18-24; Gerald T. Bennett & Arthur F. Sullwold,
Competence to Proceed: A Functional and Context-Determinative Decision, 29 J. FORENSIC
SC. 1119, 1122 (1984); Winick, Restructuring Competency, supra note 18, at 923-24 n.4; see
also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.215(b) (1990) (adjudication of incompetency to stand trial does not
render defendant incompetent for any other purpose).
229. See Winick, Voluntary Hospitalization,supra note 1, at 187-91.
230. E.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1965).
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and the criminal proceedings may continue, or in a context like
Zinermon, the patient may accept voluntary hospital admission or
treatment.
The California statutory presumption in favor of competency in
Medina represents the enlightened approach of modern mental health
law. Because the dicta in Zinermon questioning the presumption in
favor of the competency of the mentally ill was so troubling, the
Court's decision in Medina, upholding a statute adopting the identical
presumption is heartening. Although the issues in Medina were different from those in Zinermon, with the result that Medina in no way
affects the Court's earlier holding in Zinermon, Medina's endorsement of the presumption of competency is a welcome step away from
the questionable implications of Zinermon's broad dicta. Although
Medina did not present the Court with an opportunity to reconsider
the implications of its dicta in Zinermon, the Court's more recent
decision is a step in that direction.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The California statute upheld in Medina properly recognizes a
presumption in favor of competency and effectuates that presumption
by allocating the burden of proof on incompetency to stand trial to
the party raising the question. In so doing, the statute minimizes
inappropriate use of the incompetency status and unnecessary delay
in the resolution of the defendant's charges. It also creates therapeutic opportunities for defendants who are marginally impaired by
mental illness. In addition, the statute reinforces competency by
presuming it and avoiding inappropriate incompetency labeling in
cases of only marginal impairment, thereby promoting the psychological well-being of those individuals affected. Furthermore, it may
actually increase the accuracy of the competency determination process by avoiding a potential disincentive for the defendant to produce
evidence in his possession and control. The result in Medina, therefore, is clearly correct.
Less clear, however, is the wisdom of the Court's new approach
to determining the requirements of due process in the criminal area.
The Court went out of its way to adopt its new due process approach.
Having previously used the standard of Mathews v. Eldridge in the
criminal context, the Court simply could have affirmed the decision
below on the basis of that standard. The defendant had not shown
that reallocating the burden of proof to the prosecution would
increase the accuracy of competency adjudication sufficiently to justify the fiscal and social costs of doing so. Under Mathews, therefore,
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the California statute would withstand the defendant's due process
attack. Indeed, allocating the burden of proof to the party asserting
incompetency, as does the California statute, not only seems constitutionally permissible under Mathews, but it may be the most reasonable
approach to this issue and one that best effectuates the presumption in
favor of competency that has been a major reform of modern mental
health law.
Instead of affirming on the basis of Mathews, however, the Court
reached out to adopt a new and questionable due process methodology in criminal cases. Under this new approach, only practices that
offend traditional notions of fairness will violate due process. The
approach of Medina is open to criticism to the extent that it is read to
deny the Court the ability to consider whether a practice honored by
tradition has become so unfair in light of evolving standards of justice
that it is no longer the due process of law that our Constitution
promises when the state seeks to deprive an accused of his liberty.
The Medina test also deprives the Court of needed flexibility to consider newly emerging forms of injustice that have no historical analogue and to reconsider practices previously upheld that now appear
to be manifestly unjust. The Court's new test is inconsistent with the
balancing approach used in other procedural due process contextscivil procedure and administrative law-and with the Court's prior
criminal justice jurisprudence. It also is inconsistent with the Court's
historic role in construing an organic, living Constitution designed to
endure for the ages.
Not only is the Court's new approach unwise, but it was unnecessary. Because the decision below was clearly correct under Mathews,
there was no need for the Court to fashion a new due process methodology. A majority of the Court likes to think of itself as conservative-properly deferential to legislative judgment, sensitive to the
anti-democratic potential of constitutional review, bound by tradition,
and exercising judicial self-restraint. Yet it was an activist Court that
adopted the new exclusively tradition-based approach of Medina. In
reaching and resolving an issue that was unnecessary to its decision,
the Court neglected what Alexander Bickel called the "passive virtues."23' 1 A truly conservative Court should avoid unnecessarily
deciding constitutional questions, and when it invokes the Constitution should proceed narrowly, going no further than the facts of the
case require.232 Because the Court could easily have decided Medina
231. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 75 (1961).

232. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985):
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under the Mathews test, as Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
demonstrates, it was inappropriate for the Court to fashion a new
constitutional approach that will apply to all criminal cases.
Because its new approach was unnecessary, Medina's precedential force is uncertain. Indeed, the Court's approach may properly be
seen as dicta. Because the Court was closely divided on the issue of
due process methodology, with five justices favoring an exclusively
traditional approach and four favoring the more flexible balancing
test of Mathews, it was particularly inappropriate for the Court to
announce in dicta a new approach that will have such wide implications. Whether the Court's new test will be applied as rigidly as its
language suggests remains to be seen, however. In an appropriate
case, the Court may feel free to consider contemporary concepts of
fairness even when the practice in question is not condemned by history and tradition. Justice Kennedy, author of the majority opinion
in Medina, did precisely this in his concurring opinion in Riggins v.
Nevada, decided one month earlier, agreeing with the Court's conclusion that the trial of a defendant while forced to take a heavy dose of
antipsychotic medication offended due process. Moreover, in two
cases the Court decided in its 1992 Term, it cited Medina and suggested that contemporary practices should be looked at when assessing the fairness of a procedure challenged as a matter of due
233
process. 23
Because the new approach announced in Medina was
largely dicta, it should not be read to preclude the use of due process
to invalidate practices such as those in Riggins that seem manifestly
unfair even in the absence of a record of historical condemnation.
Medina thus reaches the right result-upholding the California
presumption in favor of competency and its allocation of the burden
of proof to the party contesting competency-but for the wrong reason. Although its result is correct, its reasoning needs reexamination.
Indeed, because the Court could easily have reached its conclusion by
Prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider
nonconstitutional grounds for decision. This is a "fundamental rule of judicial
restraint ....
[I]f there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the
process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions
of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is unavoidable."
(citations omitted).
233. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 866 (1993) ("In light of the historical availability of
new trials, our own amendments to Rule 33, and the contemporary practice in the states, we
cannot say that Texas' refusal to entertain petitioner's newly discovered evidence 8 years after
his conviction transgresses the principle of fundamental fairness 'rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people.' ") (citation omitted) (emphasis added); Parke v. Raley, 113 S. Ct.
517, 525 (1992) ("Respondent cites no historical tradition or contemporarypractice indicating
that Kentucky's scheme violates due process.") (emphasis added).
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applying the standard it purported to reject, the Court's new
approach is more readily open to reexamination. As a result, a future
Court, more sensitive to its historic role, can and should discard this
unduly rigid limitation on its ability to protect fundamental fairness
and fulfill the promise of due process of law.

